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INTRODUCTIONOn January 26, 2001, Diane Alexis Whipple was savagely
attacked and mauled to death just outside the door of her San
Francisco apartment building by two large dogs. Had she been
legally married, her spouse would have had standing to sue the dogs'
owners for wrongful death under California law, and might have recovered
substantial damages.2 Diane Whipple, however, was a lesbian in a
'John Gallagher, Looking for Meaning in Tragedy, THE ADVOCATE, Apr. 24,
2001, at 44, LEXIS, News Library. The article details the attack, the bizarre
circumstances surrounding the owners and ownership of the dogs, and the cause
cdl~bre that the case, and Sharon Smith, Ms. Whipple's partner, have become. It
also features a moving interview with Ms. Smith. The attorney-couple that had
custody of the dogs (ownership is in dispute) have been indicted: Majorie Noller,
who was controlling the dogs at the time, on charges of second-degree murder,
manslaughter, and failing to control an animal that causes death; and Robert Noel,
on the same charges except second-degree murder. Jaxon Van Derbeken, Mauling
Victim's Mother Sues 2 Attorneys, Building Owners, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 11,2001,
at http:llwww.sfgate.conlcgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2001/04/11/
MN1 15862. DTL.
2 Wrongful death statutes permit specified classes of those who survive the
wrongly caused death of another to recover against the tortfeasor for the loss of
anticipated economic support, and often, for the emotional loss as well. California
law is typical in permitting wrongful death recovery to surviving spouses, children,
and issue, and to others more remote under the laws of intestacy in the absence of
issue. CAL. CODE CIv. PRO. § 37.7.60(a) (2001). A second class of plaintiffs,
including parents, may also recover "ifthey were dependent on the decedent." Id.
§ 377.60(b). As the language of the statutes makes clear, Diane Whipple's mother,
who has also filed suit, see Van Derbeken, supra note 1, has a much clearer case
for recovery than does Sharon Smith, whose actual damages are presumably much
greater. The paradox is explored more fully in Part H.D.2, infra. See generally W.
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committed, seven-year relationship with another woman, Sharon Smith
Although Ms. Smith has filed a wrongful death lawsuit because of her
partner's death,4 she is extremely unlikely to be successful, because the
wrongful death statute under which she has brought suit restricts recovery
to legal spouses: a status unavailable to same-sex couples.' Similarly, had
Ms. Whipple survived although suffering severe injuries, Ms. Smith, unlike
her opposite-sex counterparts, would likely have had no legal redress for
her loss of consortium.6 Finally, had Ms. Smith observed the attack and
suffered emotional harm as a result, she, unlike a legal spouse, would have
had no suit for the negligent infliction of such harm.7 Unfortunately, these
results are not unique to California, but could be expected in almost all
states.8
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 127, at 951-
54 (5th ed. 1984). Wrongful death is discussed more fully in infra Part II.C.
3See Gallagher, supra note 1.
4 The word "partner" is inadequate to describe same-sex couples, inasmuch as
it typically connotes a business relationship. "Spouse" is in some ways better,
because its use affirms legal equivalence between same-sex and opposite-sex
couples. Given the law's refusal to recognize same-sex couples, however, "spouse"
is not fully accurate, either. The terms "husband" and "wife" have the same
problem, and are also tied, for many people, to objectionable historical assignment
of roles. "Lover" seems too broad. I have chosen "partner" here simply because it
is probably the most widely used, and therefore most understood, term. Sharon
Smith would support this choice, as she revealed in describing her relationship
with Diane Whipple: "I feel privileged to be called her partner." Gallagher, supra
note 1. Throughout this Article, I use whatever term seems compelled by the
context.
5See infra Part I.D. In California, specifically, voters in March, 2000, approved
Proposition 22, recognizing marriages only between a man and a woman. See Carol
Ness, Prop. 22 Passage Forces Gays to Regroup, S.F. EXAMINER, Mar. 8, 2000,
LEXIS, News Library. Interestingly, Sharon Smith's situation has created a
groundswell of public and legislative support for changing the state's wrongful
death law to permit domestic partners to sue. This point is discussed at infra notes
313-18 and accompanying text.
'Loss of consortium is the tort that permits recovery by spouses, and sometimes
children and parents, for the relational harm they suffer as the result of an injury
to a husband, wife, parent, or child. See KEErON ET AL., supra note 2, § 125; see
also discussion infra Part II.B.
'Assuming the injury was the result of negligence, some courts permit recovery
by bystanders who witness physical injury to a "close relation." The seminal case
is Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968). See discussion infra Part ll.A.
'See infra Part II. As discussed therein, Vermont and Hawaii are two clear
exceptions to these rigid rules.
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Sharon Smith's needlessly compounded tragedy highlights an
overlooked deficiency in the law as it applies to same-sex couples.
Although such couples are achieving some success in other areas of the
law, the tort law continues to proclaim, by a "clanging silence,"9 the
"erasure of their existence."'" Mysteriously, research of appellate decisions
discloses no cases in which a same-sex couple has even sought recovery for
the relational injury recognized by the tort of loss of consortium, and only
one rather odd (and unsuccessful) case stating a claim by a same-sex
partner for negligently inflicted emotional distress." Not counting Sharon
Smith's claim, I have found two wrongful death cases involving same-sex
couples, where the statutory limitations weigh heavily against recovery.'
2
Thus, as far as the law is concerned, tortious injuries to same-sex relations
are hardly ever even a fit subject for discussion, much less recovery.
One is at first struck by the seeming oddity of such omission. After all,
in virtually every other area of law, courts have struggled with the role,
identity, and place of same-sex couples. Consider this by no-means-
complete list of legal issues that have had to account for the presence of
same-sex couples: adoption and custody; 3 interpretation of contracts for
support; 4 the application of rent control and rent stabilization laws; 5 and
the right to marry.16 The results in these cases have been decidedly mixed,
'This phrase is lifted from Judge Oakes's opinion in Sedima v. Imrex Co., 741
F.2d 482, 492 (2d Cir. 1984) (discussing legislative silence on the reach of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act), rev'd and remanded, 473
U.S. 479 (1985).
" The Canadian Supreme Court used this term to describe the effect of legis-
lation that excluded same-sex partners from the definition of "spouse." M. v. H.
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, 7 (Can.). It is important notto gettoo far into this Article before
making the point that, as of July 1, 2000, the State of Vermont does recognize, by
statute, all three of the relational torts that are the subject of our discussion. VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(e)(2) (Supp. 2000). Such recognition was a necessary
concomitant of the Vermont legislature's judicially impelled recognition ofanew
entity called a "civil union," which is the virtual equivalent of marriage for same-
sex couples. See Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (holding that denial
of benefits of marriage to same-sex couples violated "common benefits"
requirement of Vermont Constitution, but remitting remedy issue to legislature).
"Coon v. Joseph, 237 Cal. Rptr. 873 (Dist. Ct. App. 1987), discussed in infra
Part lI.D.1.
'2 See cases cited and discussed in infra Part II.D.2.
13 See cases cited and discussed in infra Part I.C.
'4 See cased cited and discussed in infra Part I.B.
5 See cases cited and discussed in infra Part I.A.
16 See cases cited and discussed in infra Part I.D.
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but courts have not been able to avoid addressing the issues. Matters are
different in the law of torts.
At a deeper level, though, the deletion of same-sex relationships from
the tort law is all-too-consistent with the overall judicial, legislative, and
societal treatment of gay men and lesbians. Law makers and courts have
sometimes displayed sophistication in cases involving same-sex couples,
but usually only where focus can be directed toward some issue other than
the intimate life of the couple itself A few examples will illuminate the
point. Zeroing in on the best interest of a child may drive a court to permit
a lesbian or gay male partner to adopt the other's child, 7 while avoiding
discussion of the couple's intimate life implied by such a decision. In New
York, the regulations listing factors to consider in deciding whether a same-
sex partner can accede to the rent-control benefits enjoyed by a deceased
partner include every indicium of "couplehood" except "intimate sexual
relations," which are expressly declared inadmissible.' A court might be
willing to uphold a contract for support between two gay men, but only by
engaging in economic bargain analysis and expressly disallowing any
"consideration" based on the sexual relationship.
19
Reluctance to confront issues of sexual intimacy is an odd feature of
our legal culture, generally, but the situation is profoundly more acute when
discussion turns to same-sex couples.20 The uniformly dismal results to date
on the question of same-sex marriage, where the intimate life of the couple
is front-and-center, reinforce this observation. Courts, and now legislatures,
enshrine public opinion in their refusal to grant this basic right of citizen-
ship to gay men and lesbians.2' Recognizing this right would constitute "the
'7 See infra Part I.C and cases discussed therein.
'sSee infra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
'9 See infra Part I.B.
20Although consideration of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the issue of
sexual intimacy is worth an Article in itselt one need look no further than Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), for the exclanation point to the statement in the
text. There, the Court distinguished its earlier cases affirming the value of intimacy,
holding that those decisions were based on marriage, procreation and family; none
of which, it held, bore "any resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of
homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy." Id at 190-91. Never mind that one of
the earlier privacy casej, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), had embraced
unmarried people who, under the facts of the case, did not (then) want to start a
family-the case was about the right to purchase contraception.
21 In 1996, Congress enacted the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Pub. L.
No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at I U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. V 1999) and
28 U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. IV 1998)), which President Clinton signed on
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ultimate societal vindication of the reality of the lives of gay and lesbian
people." Since that reality importantly includes intimacy, same-sex
marriage is a "non-starter."
In all of the above cases except same-sex marriage, courts have been
able to manage their discomfort with same-sex relations by dodging
discussion of the sexual relation itself. Such maneuvering is not possible
with loss of consortium or negligent infliction of emotional distress,
September 21, 1996, in the middle of the night. See Todd S. Purdum, Gay Rights
Groups Attack Clinton on Midnight Signing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1996, at A22.
DOMA both limited marriage to unions of a man and a woman for federal
purposes, and purported to allow states to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages
celebrated in other states. See infra note 112 and accompanying text. More than
half the states have since enacted similar legislation, by which they declare their
refusal to recognize marriages celebrated in other states, should such unions ever
be made legal in some state. These statutes have been tracked and exhaustively
analyzed in David Orgon Coolidge & William C. Duncan, Definition of
Discrimination? State Marriage Recognition Statutes in'the "Same-Sex
Marriage"Debate, 32 CREIGHTON L. REv. 3 (1998). A recent listing appears in
Mae Kuykendall, Resistance to Same-Sex Marriage as a Story about Language:
Linguistic Failure and the Priority ofa Living Language, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 385, 392 n.22 (1999). A continually updated tracking of these laws can be
found on the website of Lambda Legal Defense. Lambda Legal Defense and
Education Fund, 2000 Anti-Marriage Bills Status Report, at http'//www.
lambdalegal.orglcgi-bin/pages/documents/record?record=578 (last modified May
25,2001).
' John G. Culhane, Uprooting the Arguments Against Same-Sex Marriage, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 1119, 1125 (1999) [hereinafter Culhane, Uprooting the
Arguments].
' In fairness to the courts, recent decisions from two state supreme courts have
begun to suggest a thawing of this position. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw.
1993) (requiring state to show compelling interest for denying right to marry to
same-sex couples), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Baehr v. Miike, 994 P.2d 566
(Haw. 1999); Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (holding that denial of
the benefits of marriage to same-sex couples violates state constitution, but leaving
remedy up to the legislature). Two features of these cases counsel caution before
allowing oneself too much optimism, however. First, they are from unusually
progressive jurisdictions, and have not resulted in same-sex marriage: in Hawaii
because of public and legislative opposition that resulted in an amendment to the
state's constitution, and in Vermont because the court did not order the remedy of
marriage in the first place. Second, even these decisions are hedged in ways that
suggest a lingering discomfort with the equality of gay and lesbian people. See
discussion infra Part I.D. The legislative response to Baker is also discussed infra
Part I.D.
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though, because these torts are either defined by, or dependent upon, sexual
intimacy.' Non-recognition is thus fully consistent with the overall legal
treatment of gay and lesbian citizens.
Refusal to recognize a claim is one thing, though, and a decisional void
is another. Why are there appellate cases on same-sex marriage, for
example, but almost none on tortious losses to same-sex relationships? One
might justifiably begin by asking whether it is fair to blame the courts for
this silence, inasmuch as the absence of cases is not their doing. This
statement is only narrowly true, however. Courts are responsible for
creating the backdrop against which decisions to pursue claims are made.
In the case of same-sex relationships in the law of torts, they have fostered
three related impediments. The first is mentioned above--litigants know
that courts are squeamish when it comes to the intimacy of same-sex
couples. Second, judicial comfort with bright-line rules discourages
litigation not only by the unmarried opposite-sex couples who have been
losing almost all of the relational injury cases, but also by same-sex
couples, who have little reason to expect understanding from the courts.
Third, the few decided cases on relational injury to same-sex couples only
reinforce reluctance to make such claims.
Even taken together, the above observations fall short of a complete
explanation for the "clanging silence." After all, the same points are true
of litigation seeking recognition of same-sex marriage, yet marriage cases
continue to be brought. So why not tort claims for injuries to relations? My
argument is that the relational injuries are plagued by additional, perhaps
intractable, difficulties. These obstacles are the inevitable products both of
the way tort cases are litigated, and of the derivative nature of relational
injuries themselves.
This Article tackles the issue ofjudicial silence directly, addressing it
with respect to the three cognate relational torts: loss of consortium,
negligent infliction of emotional distress, and wrongful death. After
discussing each of these torts, and offering some explanations for the
4 The statement in the text is truer for loss of consortium than for negligent
infliction of emotional distress, because the emotional distress claims do not
involve recovery for the loss of intimacy itself. Nonetheless, that intimacy may be
necessary to qualify as a plaintiff in an emotional distress claim in so-called
bystander cases, especially absent amarital relationship. The point is explored infra
Part II. Further, for reasons developed later in this Article, wrongful death claims
are different again, because recovery is often principally for "hard" economic loss,
with which courts are more comfortable. These cases present their own problems
of statutory interpretation, however. See infra Parts 1I.C, II.D.2.
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silence, I suggest a course of action for advocacy groups. Given the right
judicial or legislative atmosphere, claims for relational injuries could be
successful on two fronts: for the plaintiffs themselves, and as part of the
larger project of forging a complete legal existence for same-sex couples.
Part I of this Article develops the argument that, at least in the United
States, courts and legislatures have gone to great lengths to avoid acknowl-
edging that same-sex couples exist qua intimate units. This Part discusses
four diverse examples of this tendency: one state's solution to the issue of
accession to rent control benefits; the contractual rights of same-sex
couples vis-h-vis each other; the law of adoption; and same-sex marriage.
In each case, same-sex relationships are "managed" by diverting focus onto
some other issue. Where, as is the case with same-sex marriage, such
redirection is not possible, most courts have been unsympathetic. The
discussion of same-sex marriage makes the point that courts are loathe to
acknowledge the sexual intimacy of same-sex couples in part because of the
threat such intimacy poses to traditional gender roles.
In requiring discussion (or at least recognition) of intimacy, the
relational torts are like same-sex marriage in that courts have nowhere to
hide. Part I begins with a description of each of the three relational tort
claims. Unmarried opposite-sex couples have typically been unable to
recover in these cases, which spring from the loss to a couple's relationship
occasioned by the physical injury to, or death of, one of the partners. Next,
I discuss the few cases involving same-sex couples. Finally, I offer further,
practical explanations for the almost-complete absence of case law
addressing the relational losses suffered by same-sex couples.
Part ImI is a cautious call to arms. It suggests that potential plaintiffs,
and the advocacy groups that might champion their cause, seek out state
courts that have recently and consistently demonstrated fidelity to the
foundational principles of tort law-imposition of liability, within fair
limits, against those whose creation of an unreasonable risk results in
foreseeable injury to a class of plaintiffs. Courts that uncritically prefer
status-based, bright-line rules are not as faithful to the animating spirit of
tort law as those that have shown willingness to exercise flexibility. Indeed,
the tort law, given its history of commitment to the fair assignment of
liability and its often-powerful rhetoric in service of such fairness, can be
a peculiarly apt instrument for broader changes in the law. California and
(especially) Texas are discussed as particularly distressing examples of
courts that have abdicated their responsibility for the "upkeep of the
common law," while New Jersey offers a heartening instance of judicial
' Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582,594 (Cal. 1988) (Broussard, J., dissenting).
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recognition of the reality of injury. Recent developments in Hawaii and
Vermont are also mentioned as supporting a legislative approach to the
problem.
I. KEEPING THE "SEX" OUT OF "SAME-SEX COUPLES"
For reasons of politics and morale, gay and lesbian advocacy groups
have understandably trumpeted the substantial victories of the movement
toward equality.26 These achievements, however, mask an important failure
of the struggle: Only rarely do policymakers acknowledge, much less
respect, the intimate lives of same-sex couples. This aversion stems from
a deep-seated, but often unstated, discomfort with the challenge to gender
roles that same-sex couples present." Civil rights advocates might respond
to this observation by noting that American society is not generally
comfortable in acknowledging the sexual lives of any of its citizens28 and
26 Two high-profile examples are hate crimes and employment antidiscri-
mination laws. For a graphic summary of the state-by-state status of hate crime
legislation, see Still in Need of Protection, THE ADVOCATE, Oct. 12, 1999, at 46
(citing National Gay & Lesbian Task Force as source). As to anti-discrimination
laws, Nevada recently became the twelfth state to offer protection against
discriminationbased on sexual orientation, NEV.REv. STAT. §§ 613.310, .330, .350
(2000), and Maryland became the thirteenth such state, just as this Article went to
press. Senate Bill 205, Antidiscrimination Act of 2001 (May 15, 2001). For a
compendium of these statutes, including the more limited protection offered by
executive orders and by local ordinances, see Lambda Legal Defense and
Education Fund, Summary of States Which Prohibit Discrimination Based
on Sexual Orientation, at http://www.lanbdalegal.org/cgi-bin/pages/documents/
record?record=217 (last modified May 25, 2001).
27 This point forms a central thesis of my article, Culhane, Uprooting the Argu-
ments, supra note 22. Other works addressing the connection between the fear of
same-sex marriage and rigid notions of gender are Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality
and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 187; Cass R. Sunstein,
Homosexuality and the Constitution, in SEX, PREFERENCE, AND FAMILY: ESSAYS
ON LAW AND NATURE 208 (David M. Estlund & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1997).
See discussion infra Part I.D.
28 Commentators have noted that the aversion to sex has produced an unhealthy
inconsistency: on the one hand, sex is not considered a fit topic for "official
discussion;" on the other, since human beings are vitally sexual creatures, this
puritanical denial seeds a barely contained sexual titillation, at the expense of sober
discussion of important issues concerning sexuality and intimacy. See, e.g.,
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL
LIBERTYTOCIVILIZED COMMITMENT 183-84 (1996); RICHARDA. POSNER, SEXAND
REASON 9-10 (1992) ("[S]ex is not a fully respectable subject forpublic discussion
2000-2001]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
that, anyway, civil rights, not private lives, are what the state needs to
recognize. In my view, however, complicity in the closeting of the sexual
aspects of gay lives, whatever its perceived short-term necessity as a matter
of strategy, is a mistake. When the dominant society is allowed to avert its
eyes from intimate gay lives,29 it feeds a culture in which many gay people
are driven to internalize and repress important elements of their identity.
Thus, one hears implausible comments such as: "My sexual identity is a
non-issue at work"; or"In my family, sex isn't discussed by anyone. It's got
nothing to do with being gay." These statements betray the disquieting
reality that gay people have been forcibly socially constructed in ways
different from their straight co-workers and family members. With rare
exceptions, straight people do discuss their personal lives-including
family and spouse-at work, in ways as subtle as displaying a photograph
at one's desk2' That gay people do not often act similarly, or even see the
oppression, underscores the force of that oppression.
In a closely related way, this enforced de-sexing of gay and lesbian
people both limits the effectiveness of victories, and prevents other
advances entirely. For example, a law protecting against employment
in the United States (at the same time it permeates the popular media, and for that
matter high-brow art and literature as well).").2 Admittedly, there is a distinction between sexual intimacy and personal inti-
macy. This Article makes that distinction where necessary to the discussion of
courts' eagerness to look at anything but sexual intimacy.
30 For this reason, the military's "don't ask, don't tell" (and the often-omitted
"don't pursue") policy is as cruel as it has proven unworkable. Under this policy,
service members are to be discharged for homosexual acts, for statements that they
are gay, and for marrying (or attempting to marry) a member of the same sex. See
10 U.S.C. § 654 (1994). While the military culture supports the constant discussion
of matters of sex (to those often deprived of it for extended periods of time), any
such discussion by gay members is expressly prohibited. Worse, the need for
camouflage naturally supports self-abnegating heterosexual "displays" or
statements by gay men (in particular) and raises questions for women who do not
respond to the advances ofmales in the military. Fora discussion ofthe policy, see,
for example, Tobias Barrington Wolff Compelled Affirmations, Free Speech, and
the U.S. Military's Don'tAsk, Don't Tell Policy, 63 BROOK. L. REv. 1141 (1997);
Kay Kavanaugh, Don' tAsk, Don't Tell: Deception RequireA Disclosure Denied,
1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 142 (1995); Carl Riehl, UncleSam Has to Want You:
The Right ofGay Men andLesbians (and all OtherAmericans) to Bear Arms in the
Military, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 343 (1995). The federal appellate courts that have
considered the policy thus far have uniformly upheld it. Able v. United States, 155
F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998); Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126 (9th
Cir. 1997); Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256 (8th Cir. 1996); Thomasson v. Perry,
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discrimination based on sexual orientation should deter an employer from
firing a gay employee, but is not, in itself, sufficient to make that em-
ployee's need to care for an ailing same-sex partner sympathetic to the
employer-even if the employee has overcome the barrier of supported
silence mentioned above 1 As to advances precluded entirely, one need
look no further than same-sex marriage, which, as of this writing, is
nowhere legal in the United States. 2 Because courts and legislatures are
uncomfortable with the statement about intimacy that marriage signals, gay
people have found themselves reduced to battling for the often weak, spotty
package of economic benefits offered by domestic partnership 3
80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996). Support for the policy has not been as unwavering as
these results suggest, however. Injoining with four otherjudges in dissenting from
the denial of a request for a rehearing en bane in Holmes, Judge Pregerson of the
Ninth Circuit displayed a high degree of awareness about the practical effect of
imposing silence on gay and lesbian military personnel; it can "lead others to
presume that they assent to a view about their own sexuality that they do not
espouse." Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat'l Guard, 155 F.3d 1049, 1050 (1998)
(Pregerson, J., dissenting). Like the employee who feels she cannot display the
photo of her same-sex partner, the military employee would be discharged "simply
because [she] wishes to make a statement about... her innermost self." Id
"' If heterosexual employees were consistently given more sympathetic treat-
ment than their gay co-workers, a claim of discrimination would be valid, but
probably unlikely to be brought. Given the financial and psychological costs of
suing one's employer, only actions as serious as firing or failing to promote are
likely to be pursued. Cf Mary Coombs, Title VII and Homosexual Harassment
After Oncale: Was it a Victory?, 6 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 113, 144 (1999)
(noting that, even where employment discrimination against gays and lesbians is
illegal, "not all discrimination is readily apparent Thus, rules that make...
discrimination more economically rational for employers will likely lead to more
discrimination in fact.").
32 The statement in the text remains literally true, but Vermont's civil union law
purports to grant same-sex couples all of the benefits and responsibilities of
marriage, withholding only the marriage label. See supra Part I.D.
33 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-1402, 1404, 1405, 1406 (Supp. 2000)
(establishing requirements for domestic partnership and extending health care
benefits to domestic partners); Phila., Pa., Ordinance Bills 970745, 970749,
970750 (1998) (granting limited benefits to "life partners" of city employees and
defining "life partnerships"). As of January 1, 2000, California began a state-wide
domestic partnership registry, including only two benefits: hospital visitation rights
and health insurance benefits to the dependents ofcertain government employees.
Amy Pyle, State Begins Accepting Gays'Domestic Partner Sign-Ups, L.A. TIMEs,
Jan. 4,2000, at A 1. The Hawaii "package," which is actually rather comprehensive
(short of marriage), is discussed in infra Part H.D.2. For one well-articulated
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Looking at several discrete areas of law, this Part develops the
argument that judicial and legislative willingness to extend rights and
recognition to same-sex couples depends on the ability of these entities to
find some decisional "peg" other than the intimate lives of those couples.
As the discussion below demonstrates, where such indirection is possible,
progress towards equality is evident. Where focus on intimacy seems
necessary, however, the choice is often between denial and defeat.
A. Accession to Rent-ControlledApartments: The New York Experience
Apartments subject to rent-control laws are usually much less
expensive than other rental units, but the landlord is permitted to raise the
price substantially once the apartment changes lessees. The death of a
tenant typically triggers the landlord's right to dispossess others in the
apartment (and then to raise the rent), but New York has created an
important exception to this right for "family members" and "spouses," who
are permitted to remain and to accede to the benefits of lower rents. The
interesting question for present purposes is whether a same-sex partner
qualifies as a family member or a spouse.
In a path-breaking decision, the New York Court of Appeals ruled that
a gay man's surviving intimate partner was indeed a "family" member
within the meaning of the rent control regulation." Such recognition is
commendable, but a closer look at the court's language and holding reveals
an effort, perhaps necessary, to shift focus away from the couple itself.
The regulation at issue prohibited dispossessing "either the surviving
spouse of the deceased tenant or some other member of the deceased
tenant's family who ha[d] been living with the tenant."'35 Using language
that reflects an understanding of the couple's relationship, the court of
appeals found that the plaintiff could qualify as a surviving family mem-
ber:
expression ofthe view that domestic partnership ought to be preferred to marriage
for same-sex couples because the latter is too rooted in patriarchy and oppression,
see Charles R.P. Pouncy, Marriage and Domestic Partnership: Rationality and
Inequality, 7 TEMP. POL. & Crv. RTS. L. REv. 363,376-77 (1998). Butsee Barbara
J. Cox, A (Personal) Essay on Same-Sex Marriage, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE
MORAL AND LEGAL DEBATE 27 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds.,
1997) (focusing on the openness that gay and lesbian marriages signal); ESKRIDGE,
supra note 28, at 51-85 (discussing and rejecting the arguments against same-sex
marriage).
34 Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 543 N.E2d 49,53-54 (N.Y. 1989).
351d at 50 (quoting N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2204.6(d) (1987)).
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[The two men] lived together as permanent life partners for more than 10
years. They regarded one another, and were regarded by friends and
family, as spouses. The two men's families were aware of the nature of
the relationship, and they regularly visited each other's families and
attended family functions together, as a couple. Even today, appellant
continues to maintain a relationship with [the deceased's] niece, who
considers him an uncle."
36
As this heartening language suggests, the court of appeals distanced
itself from "fictitious legal distinctions [and] genetic history," preferring to
build its case from the "foundation [of] the reality of family life." '37 There
is no denying that the decision is unusually progressive, and that it provides
a powerful source of argument for cases in other areas of law, where
litigants argue fora functional definition offamily 8 It is important to note,
though, that the court avoided considering whether the couple might be
considered "spouses" under the law. The decision to look to the word
"family" instead of "spouses" might be justified as a matter of cleaner
statutory interpretation,39 but construing the word "family" probably made
36 Id at 55.
371d at 53.
" See, e.g., Taylor v. Alger, 495 N.Y.S.2d 120 (Fain. Ct. 1985) (allowing
visitation by step-great-grandfather and great-grandmother of child, based on "best
interest" standard); In re Jamal B., 465 N.Y.S.2d 115 (Fam. Ct. 1983) (dismissing
petition to terminate parental rights where maternal grandmother had exhibited a
consistent concern for, and involvement in, the welfare of autistic child). But see
Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991) (holding that former partner
in a lesbian couple is without standing to seek visitation of the child raised by the
couple); cf Brent Staples, Why Same-Sex Marriage is the Crucial Issue, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 5, 1999, at § 4, at 10 (describing the battle of gay Arizona legislator
Lieutenant Steve May to defeat a bill that would have barred counties from
permitting domestic-partner benefits; in May's words, the bill was "an attack on my
family. If you are not going to treat me fairly, stop taking my tax dollars. I'd like
to ask this Legislature to leave my family alone.').
" The rent control regulations in effect at the time (and interpreted by the court
in Braschi) did not specifically define "family member," whereas the rent
stabilization regulations did. Compare N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, §
2520.6[n] (defining and listing immediate family members for the rent stabilization
code), with id § 2204.6[d] (more broadly referring to spouses "or some other
member of the deceased tenant's family who has been living with the tenant"). One
may have inferred from the looser definition under the rent-control regulations
some willingness to read the term "family" expansively; given the specific legal
meaning of the word "spouse" in other contexts, such an inference would have
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the court feel more comfortable.40 By looking beyond the couple itself to
the extended family, the court was able to shift the focus from the couple's
intimate life to a portrait with which it was more familiar.4 '
Such reticence to deal squarely with intimacy was subsequently ratified
by New York's Division of Housing and Community Renewal ("DHCR").
In regulations passed in the immediate wake of Braschi, and challenged in
Rent Stabilization Ass 'n ofNew York City v. Higgins,42 the DHCR defined
family broadly to include: "Any other person residing With the tenant...
who can prove emotional and financial commitment, and interdependence
between such person and the tenant .... ." As the court of appeals stated
in Higgins, the regulation provides a list of non-exclusive factors relevant
to determining whether such commitment and interdependence exist," but
been harder to support. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.2(a)
(McKinney 1999) ("[a] husband or wife is a surviving spouse"); N.Y. VOL. FIRE
BEN. § 70.2. (McKinney 1988) ("'[d]ependent husband' means the 'surviving
spouse' of a female fireman").
40 As I point out at infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text, this is not to say
that indicia of family besides sexual intimacy shouldnotbe considered. Particularly
in the context of landlord-tenant law, there will be many de facto families in which
sexual intimacy forms no part of the analysis. See, e.g., 2-4 Realty Assocs. v.
Pittman, 523 N.Y.S.2d 7,7-9 (Civ. Ct. 1987) (providing a detailed and sympathetic
account ofthe deep emotional and familial ties between tenant, an elderly disabled
man, and a mother and son with whom the tenant had developed a close bond, and
also noting that "nonlegal and biological families" have long been prevalent in the
American black family), aff'd, 547 N.Y.S.2d 515 (App. Term. 1989).
"' See Culhane, Uprooting the Arguments, supra note 22, at 1141 ("[The
sexless uncles attended family functions and were accepted by the niece, thereby
creating a simulacrum of straight life that enabled dodging the challenge to gender-
based assumptions that would otherwise be presented.").
42 Rent Stabilization Ass'n of New York City v. Higgins, 630 N.E.2d 626 (N.Y.
1993).
43 I at 629. The court lists the sources of the regulations for both rent control
and rent stabilization, for both New York City and the rest of the state. Id at 629
n.2.
44Id at 629.
The specified factors are: (i) longevity of the relationship; (ii) whether the
parties share household expenses; (iii) intermingling of finances; (iv)
whether they engage in family-type activities; (v) whether they have
formalized legal obligations toward each other; (vi) whether they hold
theinselves out as family members; (vii) whether they regularly perform
family functions; and (viii) any other pattern of behavior that evidences an
intention to create a long-term, emotionally committed relationship.
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"[i]n no event would evidence of a sexual relationship between such
persons be required or considered."' Of course evidence of a sexual
relationship should not be required; to exclude such evidence, however,
does not make sense. Sexual intimacy, after all, might in a given case
provide some ofthe "intention to create a long-term emotionally committed
relationship" that the DHCR seeks.
One might apologize for this ban on evidence of sexual intimacy by
arguing that the benefits of succession are economic, not emotional, but this
response misses the point. At issue is the nature of the relationship needed
to give rise to these economic benefits, and certainly a long-term sexual
relationship, where present, is evidence of a committed relationship.
Moreover, the deliberate (and inexplicable) decision to exclude sexual
intimacy from the determination, while not particularly troublesome to
same-sex couples here, has the more generally pernicious effect of
furthering the ban on discussion of sexual intimacy from legal discourse.47
For a compelling and contrasting example of judicial and legislative
willingness to acknowledge sexual intimacy, consider the recent decision
by the Canadian Supreme Court in Attorney General for Ontario v. ."
The court was called upon to interpret a provision of the Family Law Act
enabling one member of a couple to seek support from the other upon
dissolution of a long-term relationship. The provision defined "spouse" to
include married couples and "a man and a woman who are not married to
each other and have cohabited,... continuously for a period of not less
than three years."49 Plaintiffat trial was one half ofa former lesbian couple,
who sought support from her former partner under the above section.
Because the language of the provision precluded her from doing so, she
challenged the validity of the section under a provision of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms that is roughly analogous to the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 0
4' Id at 629 (citing sources set forth in id at 629 n.2) (emphasis added).
46 8ee id
" Generally, the reluctance to weigh sexual intimacy affects opposite-sex
couples as well as same-sex couples, but the effect is more pronounced on the
latter, since they do not have marriage available as a container for legal benefits.
I M. v. H. [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 (Can.) (indexed asM. v. H.).
49 Family Law Act, RS.O., ch. F-3, § 29 (1990) (Ont.).
s Compare CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms), § 15(1) ("Every individual is equal before and under the law
and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without
discrimination.., based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age
or mental or physical disability.'), with U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State
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The court struck down the challenged section, finding that it did indeed
violate the Charter, and that no compelling justification had been adduced
to save the provision.51 For present purposes, the most interesting aspect of
the court's decision is its interpretation of the term "cohabit." Elsewhere in
the statute, the term is defined as "liv[ing] together in a conjugal relation-
ship, whether within or outside marriage."52 What, then, is meant by the
term "conjugal relationship"? Inasmlich as the phrase is not defined by
statute, the court furnished its own meaning, relying both on its own sense
of the term's general meaning, and on an earlier lower court decision.53
Beginning with the stark statement that "[c]ertainly same-sex couples will
often form long, lasting, loving and intimate relationships,"M the court
noted that the "approach to determining whether a relationship is conjugal
must be flexible." '5 The factors to be considered are: "shared shelter, sexual
and personal behaviour, services, social activities, economic support and
children, as well as the societal perception of the couple."56 Finally,
consider this significant language: "[N]either opposite-sex nor same-sex
shall make or enforce any law which shall... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."). Even though the term "sexual
orientation" is not expressly included in the above list of protected groups, the
Canadian Supreme Court's earlier decisions had established that the term is present
by implication. See Andrews v. Law Soc'y of B.C. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (holding
that the protections of the above section are to be afforded to "new" kinds of
discrimination analogous to those enumerated); Egan v. Canada [1995] 2 S.C.R.
513 (holdingunanimously that sexual orientation is such an analogous ground). For
a discussion of these points, see ROBERT WINTEMUTE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND
HUMAN RJGHTS:THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION,THEEUROPEAN CONVENTION,
AND THE CANADIAN CHARTER 151-64 (1995). For a critical analysis of
Wintemute's treatment of these issues, see John G. Culhane, Review of Sexual
Orientation and Human Rights, 16 WISC. INT'L L.J. 579, 590-94 (1998) (book
review).
11 Under § 1 ofthe Charter, the rights and freedoms protected are "subject only
to such reasonable limits... as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society." CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms), § 1(1). The Attorney General for Ontario argued,
unsuccessfully, that the provision was saved by § 1.M. v. H. [1999] 2 S.C.R at 72-
73.
52Family Law Act, R.S.O., ch. F-3, § 1(1).
3 Molodowich v. Penttinen [1980] 17 R.F.L. (2d) 376 (Ont. Dist. Ct.).
54M. v. H. [1999] 2 S.C.R. at 50.51 d at51.
561d at 50.
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couples are required to fit precisely the traditional marital model to
demonstrate that the relationship is 'conjugal.' ... [T]he relationships of
all couples will vary widely."5
This refreshingly candid recognition that sexual intimacy plays a
significant part in many committed relationships stands in telling opposi-
tion to the express refusal by New York's DCHR to find this highly
probative evidence even admissible. The Canadian Supreme Court honors
same-sex couples, recognizing that such couples can be loving and intimate
even though they do not fit the traditional model. Further, the Court is
unafraid of the flexible inquiry that will be required to determine whether
a relationship is conjugal 8 Such an unabashed view of non-traditional
couples can advance the cause of opposite-sex couples as well as same-sex
couples, by creating fertile soil for changing laws-such as those applying
to tortious injuries to relations--that are now rooted in simplistic rules
based on narrow notions of legal status.
B. Support Agreements Between Same-Sex Partners
Beginning with the well-known case ofMarvin v. Marvin,5 9 courts have
shown some willingness to enforce contractual arrangements entered into
between unmarried cohabitants.6 One consistent limitation, however, has
been that sexual services can form no part of the consideration for such an
agreement. Courts have typically based the prohibition on the illicit nature
of sex between unmarried people, but this justification misses the mark.
Even a married couple should not be permitted to contract for sexual
services, and not just because of the law against payment for sex (i.e.,
prostitution). Rather, two people in an intimate sexual relationship are
(or should be) deriving mutual fulfillment and pleasure from their mo-
57Id at 51.
5' As I argue in Part IlI.A, the need for flexibility is particularly acute in tort
law.
59 Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976). The case involved an opposite-
sex couple, of which one member was the actor Lee Marvin.
' Martha Ertman has argued that contract provides a sort of "halfway house"
between complete legal non-status and full recognition. Martha M. Ertman,
ContractualPurgatoryfor Sexual Marginorities: Not Heaven, but Not Hell Either,
73 DENY. U. L. REv. 1107 (1996). The argument, in sum, is that the state may be
willing to allow gay people and couples to enter into enforceable contracts before
it is "ready" to grant full legal recognition. See id
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ments of intimacy. Given such mutuality, what justifies paying for the sex
itself?
6'
Here, then, is an instance where a court should look for a way to sever
the sexual relations from the other services alleged to form the consider-
ation for the contract. In many of these cases, one partner is the traditional
"bread-winner," while the other remains at home and attends to a myriad
of tasks-housework, cooking, "chauffeuring," bill-paying and family
accounting, and so on. Courts have properly held that such tasks are
compensable. They have recognized that, in many cases, one member of the
couple gives up a career outside of the home. Although the separation of
sex from other signs of a committed relationship is defensible in this
context, the cases demonstrate, from a different perspective, the ability of
unsympathetic courts to use the intimacy of same-sex couples to deny them
fair treatment.
Of course, one tactic is to ignore the relationship altogether, but, as
Crooke v. Gilden62 shows, considerable effort is required to do so. There,
the court had before it the validity of a contract for the partition of real
estate between-who knows? The court says nothing about the parties,
refusing even to divulge their sex! In fact, the case involved a lesbian
couple, but one has to do some detective work to discover that simple fact,
which appears nowhere in the decision.63 The court's reference to the
relationship is similarly cryptic: "Crooke contends... that parol evidence
showing an illegal and immoral relationship between the parties is
admissible and demonstrates that this contract is void .... ." The court
upheld the contract without further discussion of the relationship.
61 One should not be so naive as to suppose that the power differential in a
couple, particularly a male-female couple, will preclude one partner's engaging in
sexual relations with the other out of economic necessity. Indeed, women have
sometimes stated that they perceived it as their role to engage in sexual relations
with the men with whom they cohabitate. See, e.g., Alderson v. Alderson, 225 Cal.
Rptr. 610, 617 (Ct. App. 1986). Inasmuch as there are other incidents of the
cohabitation relationship that should be compensable, however, a strong argument
against commodifying the sexual relationship can be stated. This point is not
inconsistent with the theory underlying the tort of loss of consortium. The latter
involves a loss caused by a thirdparty's negligence to a relationship that the couple
was, in fact, enjoying. As difficult as such a relationship, is to quantify, that loss is
both real and uninvited. On the otherhand, there is no legal duty for either member
of the couple to "remit" sexual services to the other.62 Crooke v. Gilden, 414 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. 1992).
63 See Nancy Ehrenreich, The Progressive Potential in Privatization, 73 DENY.
U. L. REV. 1235, 1249 (1996).
64 Crooke, 414 S.E.2d at 646 (citation omitted).
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In most courts, somewhat less of a Jane Austen sensibility is in
evidence. Inasmuch as the cases intractably involve some element of
intimacy, the question then becomes whether a same-sex couple will be
given fair treatment. Two California appellate decisions stand in instructive
contrast. In Jones v. Daly, the court ruled that the illegal consideration for
sex could not be separated from plaintiff's agreement to act as "traveling
companion, housekeeper or cook." In Whorton v. Diffingham,' on the
other hand, the court did permit severance of the illegal consideration from
the bulk of other tasks the plaintiff claimed he agreed to perform in
exchange for financial support, which included "chauffeur, bodyguard,
social and business secretary, partner and counselor in real estate invest-
ments, ... constant companion, confidant, [and] traveling and social
companion." While the list of"oceupations" in Whorton is considerably
more comprehensive than that in Jones, the Whorton court found such
services as "chauffeur" to be those for which people typically get paid, and
therefore compensable.69 The Jones court, on the other hand, refused to so
regard the plaintiff's efforts as "housekeeper" or "cook." 0 Further, the
Jones court cited Marvin v. Marvin approvingly, even though the plaintiff's
promises there-to act as "companion, homemaker, housekeeper and
cook'"-were indistinguishable from those in the case before it"'
The real problem with the agreement in Jones is something of a flip-
side to the courts' usual inability to "see" the intimacy of same-sex
couples. Since the plaintiff in Jones did not permit the court to avert its
attention from intimacy, he was punished by having that intimacy extended
outward to engulf, and so to extinguish, otherwise compensable claims.
Note what happened when Jones dared to call himself the defendant's
"lover:"
[Tihey agreed that... plaintiff would render his services to Daly as "a
lover, companion, homemaker, traveling companion, housekeeper and
cook."... [P]laintiff allowed himself to be known to the general public
as the "lover and cohabitation mate" of Daly. These allegations clearly
show that plaintiffs rendition ofsexual services to Daly was an insepara-
65 Jones v. Daly, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Ct. App. 1981).
'Id at 134.
'7 Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Ct. App. 1988).
"Id at 406-07.691d at 409.




ble part of the consideration for the "cohabitors agreement," and indeed
was the predominant consideration .... [T]he words "cohabitating" and
"lover" do not have the innocuous meanings which plaintiff ascribes to
them. These terms can pertain only to plaintiffs rendition of sexual
services to Daly.'2
What other word, besides "lover," was the plaintiff supposed to use?
Husband and wife would have worked, apparently; in Marvin, the court
effectively held that the words "husband and wife" did not mean that sexual
relations were part of the "package" of services.' Unfortunately for the
plaintiff, though, the law's refusal to grant legal recognition to the
committed relationships of same-sex couples deprived him of that option.
Perhaps the more business-like "partner" would have worked;74 if so, the
point about judicial unwillingness to recognize the intimate lives of same-
sex couples is again underscored. In short, the plaintiff was punished for
"flaunting" (by mentioning) his intimacy.75
Another same-sex support case shows that unwillingness to see same-
sex partners as equivalentto "husband and wife" may have damaging ripple
effects. In Silver v. Starrett,76 the defendant claimed that her agreement to
pay support was obtained through duress. Under the facts of the case, no
such argument could be successfully made. Nonetheless, the New York
Supreme Court (New York County) took a detour into dictum to note that,
had the plaintiff been husband and wife, duress would have been more
easily proven because of the fiduciary relationship that attaches to the
marital state.' As to "nonmarital agreements," "strict surveillance as to
7id at 133.
73 See Whorton, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 408 (discussing the holding in Marvin and
noting that "apparently the [Marvin] court did not interpret [husband and wife] as
expressly indicating sexual services were part of the consideration").
74 In the movie American Beauty (Dreamworks SKG 1999), the powerful asso-
ciation between the term "partner" and business is played for a laugh. One of the
characters is anex-military suburbanite who, uponhearingthathis two cohabitating
male neighbors are partners, asks them what business they are in. The character
later inveighs against gays who "flaunt" their sexual identity. At the risk of ruining
one of the movie's revelations, the character turns out to be a closeted gay man
himself.
75 It should be noted that the court in Whorton could have done the same thing
as the court in Jones, because the plaintiff in Whorton also used the word
"lover"-albeit at the end (not the beginning) of the "string.' Whorton, 248 Cal.
Rptr. at 407.
76 Silver v. Starrett, 674 N.Y.S.2d 915 (S. Ct. N.Y. County 1998).
71 Id at 918.
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separation agreements" does not apply.78 Whatever the state's policy as to
same-sex marriage, the court's approach elevates status over reality, and
submerges same-sex intimacy. It is thus at odds with the functional analysis
mandated by the New York Court of Appeals in Braschi.79 In practice, the
same-sex (or unmarried opposite sex) couple is quite as likely to have the
same kinds of psychological issues between them as those animating the
fiduciary rule for legal spouses. As we shall see, this kind of formalism
poses problems for torts plaintiffs as well.
C. Same-Sex Adoption and Custody
Anyone who has given thought to the matter will have been struck by
the paradox that courts have been far more willing to permit same-sex
couples to create families with children than to permit same-sex marriage.
Social science research suggests that children do better in stable families, 0
and marriage creates stability. Why is it, then, that at least some courts
recognize that the best interests of children may be served by permitting
gay and lesbian adoption and custody, but do not allow the marriages that
will further those interests?81 Again, the answer lies in the court's ability,
in cases involving children, to focus on issues other than the intimate (sex)
lives of the couple. In the adoption and custody cases, courts look squarely
at what is best for the child. When the issue moves to marriage, the
discomfort with intimacy bubbles to the surface. It is therefore predictable
that the hardest cases involve conflicts between gay and straight parents
over custody, where courts must accommodate the cardinal principle that
the child's best interest is paramount with their ingrained view that a
78 d
79 See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
SO In a provocative (and provocatively titled) article, Barbara Dafoe Whitehead
summarized some of the research, and suggested that the uncomfortable
implications of the studies' conclusions-including that divorce and single-parent
households are bad for children--have kept them from the center of public
discourse. Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, Dan Quayle Was Right, THE ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Apr. 1993, at 47. She acknowledges that not all of the studies tend
toward those conclusions, however. Id. at 82. If stability is better for children, then
recognizing same-sex marriages promotes that goal.
SI See EsKRIDGE, supra note 28, at 111 (By opposing same-sex marriage the
objectors are in reality subverting families. . . and penalizing children. State
prohibition of same-sex marriage is antifamily, anticommitment, and anti-
children."); see also Kathryn Kendell, Lesbian Couples Creating Families, in ON
THE ROAD TO SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 41,42 (Robert P. Cabaj & David W. Purcell
eds., 1998).
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straight household, however dysfunctional, remains superior to a "queer"
household. 2 Substantial scholarship has been devoted to the complex
issues concerning gay family law issues, including adoption and custody.'
My limited purpose here is to highlight a few developments that illustrate
judicial inconsistency when it comes to serving the best interests of
children.
The simplest cases are those involving simple, uncontested adoptions
by a gay man or a lesbian, or by a same-sex couple. Assuming no contrary
state statutory law," some of these cases show deep empathy for the
family.85 In fact, a judge who shows unfounded hostility towards such
adoptions may find herself at the receiving end of a strong rebuke from the
appellate court. In In re C.MA.,' the First District Illinois Appellate Court
excoriated trial judge Susan McDunn for what it called "extreme and patent
bias against the adoptive parents based upon their sexual orientation."87
Judge McDunn's handling of the case had indeed been both appalling8 and
82 My use of the term "queer" in this context is meant to signal the courts'
general view that households headed by gay and lesbian people are odd and
inexplicable.
83 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDaE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY,
GENDER, AND THE LAW 827-68 (1997); Craig W. Christensen, Legal Ordering of
Family Values: The Case ofGay andLesbian Families, 18 CARDOZO L. REv. 1299
(1997); Mark Strasser, Family, Definitions, and the Constitution: On the
Antimiscegenation Analogy, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 981 (1991).
" Until recently, only Florida prohibited gay adoptions. FLA. STAT. ANN. §
63.042(3) (West 1997) ("No person eligible to adopt under this statute may adopt if
that person is a homosexual"). Recent legislation in Mississippi and Utah also pro-
hibits such adoptions, as do state agency rules in Arkansas. See States That Prohibit
Homosexualsfrom Adopting Children, at http://www.gayrightsinfo.com (last modi-
fied May 4,2000). New Hampshire recently changed its law against such adoptions.
1999 N.H. LAWS Ch. 18 ("An Act removing the prohibition on adoption and foster
parenting by homosexual persons."). The law went into effect on July 2, 1999.
S5 5ee cases discussed in Christensen, supra note 83, at 1300-02.
In re C.M.A., 715 N.E.2d 674 (111. App. Ct. 1999).87 Id at 679.
8 Her dismal handling of the case is summarized by Lambda Legal Defense and
Education Fund. See Press Release, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund,
Illinois Appeals Court Officially Rebukes Rogue Judge, at http://www.
lanbdalegal.org/cgi-bin/pages/documents/record?record=461 (July 21, 1999).
According to the summary, she "ignored positive recommendations from court-
appointed guardians and testimony from social workers that said the children were
thriving and that 'highly recommended' the adoptions as in their best interests." Id.
In addition to delaying the adoptions, "she appointed the anti-gay Family Research
Council to represent the best interests of the children." Id
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defiant, 9 but the court's language focused as much on affirming the
couple's relationships with the children as on criticizing the trial judge. The
parents "came to our state court system in order to be allowed to adopt
children, children with whom they had already formed a loving relationship
over a period of time. A higher purpose cannot be imagined." It bears
repeating that this "higher purpose" does not include same-sex marriage,
despite the court's rhetoric.
A more impressive example of judicial willingness to look favorably
at same-sex adoptions arises in those states with statutes requiring, in
contests between a biological parent and a putative adopting parent, a
demonstration that the biological parent is unfit. Typically, such statutes
create an exception where the person wishing to adopt is a stepparent of the
child.9' The logic for the exception is that, inasmuch as the stepparent and
the biological parent are going to raise the child together, requiring a
demonstration of the biological parent's lack of fitness defeats the purpose
of the general rule. The problem for same-sex couples is that their inability
to marry makes them technically incapable of being stepparents, so that the
statutory exception is, on its face, unavailable to them.
Caught in this squeeze between recognizing the reality of the same-sex
couple's de facto marriage and serving the best interests of the child, at
least some courts have permitted the stepparent exception to apply in these
cases.' It is crucial to highlight that courts can reach this result only by
reading the statute in apparent defiance of its clear language, and thereby
recognizing the couple, for this purpose at least, as effectively married. As
the Vermont Supreme Court stated: "[i]t would be against common sense
to terminate the biological parent's rights when thatparent will continue
to raise and be responsible for the child, albeit in afamily unit with a
"Id ("Even after the presiding judge removed Judge McDunn from both cases
for bias and other causes, she refused to relinquish control of them and... issued
orders purporting to void her removal and block the adoptions.").
o In re C.M.A., 715 N.E.2d at 680 (emphasis added).
9' This point is ably explored by Marla J. Hollandsworth, Gay Men Creating
Families Through Surro-Gay Arrangements: A Paradigm for Reproductive
Freedom, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER& L. 183,238-39 (1995).
1 See, e.g., Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993); In re Jacob,
660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995); Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993).
But see In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1994). Even in Angel Lace,
however, a concurring justice expressed frustration at being constrained by the




partner who is biologically unrelated to the child." Further, sympathetic
courts reinforce this recognition by relying on the length of the relationship
as evidence that the child's best interest will be served by permitting the
stepparent to adopt 4 Thus, thejudiciary approaches tacit recognition ofthe
intimate (married) life of the couple by indirection, avoiding focus on what
it finds most vertiginous.
In cases pitting straight and gay parents against each other in custody
battles, the wall between the courts' views of the same-sex couple, on the
one side, and the family, including children, on the other, cannot easily be
propped up. Because the central issue remains the child's best interests, the
courts have had to accommodate their own views about the supposed
superiority of opposite-sex orientation to the reality of the child's life. This
imagined tension has led to confusion and inconsistency in the decisional
law.
Although courts have been moving away from aper se rule excluding
gay and lesbian parents from gaining or retaining custody of, or visitation
rights to, their children,' a number of them have impeded custody (or even
' Adoption ofB.L. VB., 628 A.2d at 1274 (emphasis added). With the enact-
ment of Vermont's civil union law, this decision's statutory interpretation is
probably moot, because the stepparent exception should apply to the non-biological
parent in such a union just as it would with a married (opposite-sex) couple. The
civil union law is discussed more fully in infra Part I.D.
94 See Adoption ofTammy, 619 N.E.2d at 3 16 (ten years); In re Jacob, 660 A.2d
at 398 (nineteen years); Adoption ofB.L. VB., 628 A.2d at 1272 (seven years). By
contrast, in a leading case involving the attempted adoption by one same-sex
partner of the other, the court read the statutory language of the adoption statute
narrowly to avoid allowing one same-sex partner to adopt the other. In re Robert
Paul P., 471 N.E.2d 424 (N.Y. 1984). Since no third party's interests were at stake,
the court retreated to its basal discomfort with same-sex intimacy, a discomfort
lanced by the dissenting opinion: "[Niothing in the statute requires an inquiry into
or evaluation of the sexual habits of the parties to an adult adoption... ." Id at 429
(Meyer, J., dissenting). Nonetheless, the court was sufficiently spooked by the
prospect of such an adoption that it failed to perceive that the statutory language
that it quoted actually supported the adoption, which had to be "'in the best
interests of the [adoptee].' "Id. at 426.
95 See ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 83, at 832-33 (citing early cases and
literature). One commentator has discerned three broad approaches to the question
of the suitability of a gay or lesbian parent: some courts create an irrebuttable
presumption against such a parent; others require the parent to rebut a presumption
of unfitness; and still others do not regard same-sex orientation as disqualifying,
although they do look to see whether a harm to the child is likely. Note, Custody
Denials to Parents in Same-Sex Relationships: An Equal Protection Analysis, 102
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visitation) by parents of same-sex orientation by creating presumptions
against, or imposing special conditions on, them.' In Bottoms v. Bottoms,
97
the Virginia Supreme Court, although noting that it had earlier discarded
the rule that a lesbian parent was inherently, orper se unfit," upheld the
trial judge's determination that custody should be awarded to the grand-
mother, not the biological (lesbian) mother. The court reached its conclu-
sion even though the trial judge had applied the per se rule. Ordinarily, of
course, the lower court's application of the wrong rule of law would have
resulted in a remand for new findings, if not a new hearing." Since the
mother was a lesbian, however, the Virginia Supreme Court did not trouble
itself to follow the proper procedure.
Even in those jurisdictions exhibiting a less benighted approach, the
cases are sometimes redolent of homophobic assumptions about the "best
interests" of the child. For example, in Conkel v. Conkel,"0 the court
stressed the child's best interest in letting stand the trial court's decision to
allow overnight visitation to the gay father. But that same decision had
imposed the condition that the father not have present any non-related male
person.' It is unlikely that such a condition would have been imposed-or
allowed to stand by the appellate court-if the father were involved with
a woman." The court's repeated assumption that same-sex orientation is
a "fault,"--meant, oddly, as supporting the rights of a gay parent, since we
all have "faults" 03-- underscores the court's disparate treatment of straight
HARv. L. REv. 617, 619-20 (1989). Too much should not be made of such
categories, however, especially in an area so volatile. One recent work places the
English courts somewhere between the second and third categories mentioned
above. See NICHOLAs BAIFoRTH, SEXUALTY, MORALS AND JUSTIcE 52 (1997).
9 See EsKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 83, at 837. As the authors point out,
some state statutes require the court to consider the parent's "moral fitness," while
the judiciary in other states has presumed against the gay or lesbian parent in a
dispute with their straight former spouses. Id
9 Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995).
Id at 108.
9 This point was expressed in Justice Keenan's dissent. Id at 109 (Keenan, J.,
dissenting).
"0 Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987).
101 Id at 984. Some decisions have refused to impose such a requirement. See,
e.g., Birdsall v. Birdsall (In re Marriage of Birdsall), 243 Cal. Rptr. 287 (Ct. App.
1988); In re Marriage of Diehl, 582 N.E.2d 281 (Il. App. Ct. 1991); North v.
North, 648 A.2d 1025 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994); Blew v. Verta, 617 A.2d 31 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1992).
'02 See ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 83, at 836-37.
10 Conkel, 509 N.E.2d at 986.
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and gay parents. Again, when the focus moves to the private lives of same-
sex couples, the results are not encouraging.
D. Same-Sex Marriage
This is not the place for a full-throated discussion of same-sex
marriage."0' My goal, instead, is to lead into the discussion of the tort law's
silence on relational injuries to same-sex couples by explaining and
emphasizing the strength of opposition to their intimate lives in the setting
that has generated the most heat.
From a purely legal standpoint, same-sex marriage has been an
unremitting failure, to date. A spate of early cases dismissed the discrimina-
tion claims of same-sex applicants for marriage licenses with little analysis,
leaning on the unhelpful tautology that marriage means the union of a man
and a woman." A breakthrough once seemed imminent in Hawaii, when
that state's supreme court ruled, in Baehr v. Lewin,"°6 that the state needed
to show a compelling interest in order to deny marriage licenses to same-
sex couples. Even this decision, though, reiterated judicial squeamishness
with the intimate lives of same-sex couples. The decision was based not on
the fundamental right to marry, but on the impermissibility, under the
Hawaii State Constitution, of distinctions based on sex.107 Moreover, the
court ignored the parties' sexual orientation (and therefore their intimate
lives) in the face of their proclamation of such orientation, stating that the
parties to a same-sex marriage might not be "homosexual." ' Note the
willful uncoupling of sex and marriage that this statement achieves.
In any event, the trial court held on remand that no such interest had
been shown." While the case was under a second appeal to the Hawaii
Supreme Court, however, the electorate voted to grant the legislature the
"I See Culhane, Uprooting the Arguments, supra note 22, at 1121 n.5 (citing
some of the vast literature on the subject).
"IS ee Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Min. 1971) (stating that the
historic institution ofmarriage "uniquely involv[es] the procreation and rearing of
children"); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (explaining that
marriage is a relationship "which may be entered into only by two persons who are
members of the opposite sex").
106 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). When the state's director of
public health was replacedby Lawrence Miike, the casename changed accordingly.
107 Id at 60.
'0 Id at51 &n.1l, 52 & n.12.
1o9Baehr v. Miike, CIV. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec.
3, 1996).
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power to amend the state constitution to define marriage as a union
between "a man and a woman." ' After that development, the Hawaii
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for entry of judgment
against the plaintiff.'
If anything, the Hawaii experience shows the force of opposition to
same-sex marriage. Not only did the electorate vote, by approximately a2-1
margin, to permit the constitutional amendment, but the very possibility
that even one state might grant such recognition triggered something of a
national panic. Shortly after the Hawaii Supreme Court issued its first
ruling, Congress threw aside its long-standing deference to the states on
eligibility for marriage by overwhelmingly enacting the defiantly named
Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA"). DOMA both defined marriage, for
federal purposes, as between a man and a woman, and purported to grant
the states power to deny recognition to same-sex marriages performed in
another state.1 For their part, states enacted "mini-DOMAs" that declared
it to be state policy not to recognize same-sex marriages celebrated in any
other state.
113
10 The proposed amendment to Art. I. of the state constitution provided:
"Section 23. The legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage to opposite-
sex couples." 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws H.B. 117, § 2. Voters overwhelmingly
accepted this amendment in November 1998. See Sam Howe Verhovek, From
Same-Sex Marriage to Gambling Voters Speak N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1998, at B1.
"'Baehr v. Miike, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999) (unpublishedtable decision). For
the full opinion of the court, see Baehr v. Miike, No. 20371, 1999 Haw. LEXIS
391 (Dec. 9, 1999).
11 See Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Pub. L. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419
(1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. V 1999) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. IV
1998)). DOMA provides, in relevant part:
No state... shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or
judicial proceeding of any other State... respecting a relationship between
persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such
other State... or a right or claim arising from such relationship.
28 U.S.C. § 1738C. It further states:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling,
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and
agencies ofthe United States, the word "marriage" means only a legal union
between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word
"spouse" refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or
wife.
1 U.S.C. § 7.




The reaction triggered by the possibility that same-sex couples from
other states might celebrate their marriage in Hawaii, and then demand
recognition of that marriage in their state of residence, reveals the visceral
hostility to same-sex marriage. A solid majority of the population opposes
same-sex marriage, even though, on other issues, people are much more
supportive of the rights of gay and lesbian people.' The fall-out from
Baehr reveals the deep source of discomfort with same-sex intimacy, which
the prospect of marriage obviously calls up in the most fundamental way.
Even the recent decision by the Vermont Supreme Court in the
landmark case of Baker v. State"' reveals lingering disquiet with gay and
lesbian lives. There, the court unanimously held that the state's denial of
the benefits of marriage to same-sex couples violated the state's guarantee
of equal protection, expressed in Vermont through the state constitutional
requirement that no citizen be deprived of the common benefits of the
law." 6 Note that the court found only that the denial of the benefits of
marriage violated the common benefits clause, stopping short of holding
that same-sex couples have the right to many."7 The matter of how to
afford the benefits of marriage was left to legislative determination. The
Vermont legislature then passed, and the governor signed, a bill to create
an entity called the "civil union," which provides "all the same benefits,
protections and responsibilities" that spouses now have."8 In so acting, the
legislature solved, if only in Vermont, the problem under discussion in this
Article, by allowing parties to a civil union to bring all "causes of action
related to or dependent upon spousal status, including an action for
wrongful death, emotional distress, loss of consortium, ... or other torts...
114 See Marc Peyser, Battling Backlash, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 17, 1998, at 50, 51
(citing Newsweek poll in which 83% favored equal employment rights, 75% were
for equal housing rights, and slightly more than 50% favored allowing same-sex
partners to inherit each other's Social Security benefits, but only 33% favored
legalizing same-sex marriage). A more recent Newsweek poll yielded quite similar
results, leading to the comment that, "[o]n more intimate issues... straight people
are not always so comfortable." John Leland, Shades ofGay, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 20,
2000, at 46, 49.
11 Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
" 61d at 867.
117 1d at 886-88 (discussing the appropriate remedy).
Il VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(a) (Supp. 2000). A good discussion and
summary of the "civil union" act can be found at the website of the Human Rights
Campaign. Recent Developments in Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Law,
LAW BRIEFS (Human Rights Campaign, Washington, D.C.), at
http://www.hrc.org/pubs/lawbriefs/lawb0302.html (Spring 2000).
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related to, or dependent upon spousal status."' 9 Nonetheless, the court's
approach underlines the point about discomfort with same-sex intimacy.
The court's stated reason for its deference to the legislature is one of
modesty and respect for a coordinate branch of government. 2 ' Inasmuch
as the court required that same-sex couples receive the same benefits as
opposite-sex couples, it may seem uncharitable to criticize what was surely
a sound political compromise."' Nonetheless, nothing short of marriage can
achieve even formal equality." More significantly, the court's approach
is sadly similar to the "separate but equal" status under which African-
Americans labored for a full century following the end of the Civil War."z
The decision betrays a lingering allegiance to a caste system of sexual
orientation that subtly devalues the intimate lives of gays and lesbians by
denying them access to the social approbation that enshrines the institution
of marriage.
Such approbation, in turn, remains tethered to a static portrait of
marriage that is in fact out-of-step with reality, but that continues to be
reinforced through ritual. Consider the traditional trappings, even today, of
most weddings. From the ceremonial wedding dress and tuxedo, to the
119 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(eX2).
120 Baker, 744 A.2d at 888. The court was also alive to the possibility that
judicially requiring the state to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples would
invite the same type of legislative and popular response that mooted decisional law
in Alaska and Hawaii. Id
12 Cf Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARv. L.
REv. 4, 101 (1996) ("Courts do best by proceeding in a way that is catalytic rather
than preclusive, and that is closely attuned to the fact that courts are participants in
the system of democratic deliberation.").
" For example, a Vermont same-sex couple that attempts to use its "civil
union" status in some other state, perhaps during a vacation, may encounter
difficulties that a married couple would not. It seems to me unlikely that the state
or private actors in other states would accord this unique legal creature the status
of marriage. After all, if the state of origin does not deem the couple worthy of the
"real thing," why should any other state? On the other hand, the term "civil union"
is not covered by the various defense of marriage statutes, so that such statutes do
not literally apply to this entity. Even absent a state defense of marriage act, these
problems of definition and application compound the difficulty that courts will
have to face when these statutes are challenged.
' Although the U.S. Supreme Court declared racially segregated schools
inherently unequal in 1954, Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), it was not
until 1967 that a similar "separate but equal" statute prohibiting certain interracial
marriages was struck down, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), thereby
bringing to a belated end the era of anti-miscegenation laws.
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bachelor party, to the public celebration and affirmation of the couple's
commitment, weddings reflect frozen images of gender roles.24 Although
feminists have done much-needed work in challenging the scripted roles
assigned to "husband" and "wife,"'7the stubborn persistence of traditional-
ism that surrounds the wedding ritual reflects resistance to those chal-
lenges. 26 Supporters of the recently passed Proposition 22 in California,
which purports to "define" marriage as a union "between a man and a
woman," played this "tradition card" to winning effect in television
advertisements depicting a Mexican-American couple celebrating their
fiftieth anniversary. 27 With relatives gathered around the couple, the voice-
over tied this portrait to its political end: "The family just gets bigger and
bigger, with children, grandchildren, and now great-grandchildren....
Marriage and family-that's what Proposition 22 is all about."'" What it
is not about is the reality of the intimate lives of same-sex couples.
Same-sex couples, obviously, pose a far greater challenge than, say,
working women, to traditional understandings of the proper expressions of
gender identity. On the level of ritual alone-a level that should not be
discounted--same-sex couples require viewing a different portrait. 9 That
24 Surely no more dramatic example can be found of the continuing power of
such gender roles than the FOX television network's hugely successful show, Who
Wants to MarryaMulti-Millionaire (FOX televisionbroadcast, Feb. 15, 2000), in
which a tuxedoed rich guy chose a bride from among fifty female hopefuls, and
married her (after a swim suit competition, among other selection criteria) on the
air. That blind adherence to such roles is a mistake was borne out by subsequent
events: the couple's "marriage" didn't survive their honeymoon.
's See, e.g., BETTY FRmDAN, THE FEMmNE MYsTIQUE (1963); Phyllis T.
Bookspan, A Delicate Imbalance-Family and Work, 5 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 37,
74 (1995) "We should... dig out the old idea that no man can take full care of a
child and that every woman can." (quoting PENELOPE LEACH, CHILDREN FIRST 32
(1994))).
16 A related point is that some of the opposition to same-sex marriage can be
attributed to the fear that the presence of legally sanctioned same-sex couples
would unmask the truth that the institution of marriage has already undergone
seismic and irreversible change. John G. Culhane, Same-Sex Marriage: The Depth
ofthe Opposition andthe Importance of Victory, 3 J. GAY & LESBIAN MED. Ass'N
103, 106 (1999).
127 Nita Lelyveld, Prop. 22 Ads Focused on Traditional Family, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Mar. 13, 2000, at AS.
128 Id
9 Such visual vertigo also provides some part of the explanation for the long
and extant opposition to interracial marriage. Even relatively recently, a survey
revealed that, although most people believed such marriages should be legal, there
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such a challenge causes vertigo even among those who might otherwise be
expected to be sympathetic to same-sex marriage is reflected in statements
such as "I feel I'm on ground full of quicksand," 30 by then-Senator Bill
Bradley. When it comes to same-sex couples, many have difficulty in
seeing beyond sexual intimacy-an intimacy that, in turn, presents a threat
to scripted roles of male and female. In sum, the Vermont Supreme Court
was in plentiful company in denying same-sex couples access to the one
institution that would make them testaments to the changed truth about
once-rigid gender roles.
Justice Denise Johnson, concurring in part and dissenting in part with
the majority's holding in Baker, showed rare insight in perceiving the
vestigial link between the continued restriction of marriage to opposite-sex
couples and archaic notions of the "proper" roles of men and women. As
she stated, these "stereotypical imaginings " are tied to "the outmoded
conception that marriage requires one man and one woman, creating one
person-the husband."'3 The state, she concluded, should have no part in
fostering the continuation of such dehumanizing myths.
The commitment of Western society to simplistic notions of gender as
determined by biological differentiation into male and female is not
inevitable.' For a backyard example of more diverse representations of
gender, consider that the pre-Columbian Natchez tribe had among them a
man called "chief of the women," who had the dress and occupations of the
women in the tribe, as well as the role of household helper to the male
was still not a majority that approved of them. See Lynne Duke, 25 Years After
Landmark Decision, Still the Rarest of Wedding Bonds, WASH. POST, June 12,
1992, at A3 (explaining that in a 1991 Gallup Poll 45% disapproved and 44%
approved; when question was of approval of such marriages involving a close
relative, disapproval jumped to 65%).
130 142 CONG. REC. S10124 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Bradley on DOMA).
131 Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864,910 (Vt. 1999) (Johnson, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
131 ld at 912.
133 See JAMAKE HIGHWATER, THE MYTHOLOGY OF TRANSGRESSION: HOMO-
SEXUALITY AS METAPHOR (1997); see also ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 83,
at 262-82; LEILAJ. Rupp, A DESIRED PAST: A SHORT HISTORY OF SAME-SEXLOVE
IN AMERICA 17-19 (1999) (noting that some Native Americans recognized three
genders: male, female, and a transformative, half man/half woman, third gender);
id at 24-27 (discussing same-sex activity and gender diversity among Africans
before enslavement). A novel that chronicles the life of a Native American
Berdache (a biological man with dominant female aspects) is TOM SPANBAUER,
THE MAN WHO FELL IN LOVE WITH THE MOON (1991).
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hunters."' More recently, the Zuni Indians counted among themselves a
biological man, We'wha, whose sex was presumed female (even to an
anthropologist studying the tribe) until death.'35 We'wha was a religious
and tribal leader, far from being vilified for a rare expression of gender,
We'wha was celebrated as a manifestation of the divine.'36 Further, she was
married to a man.
Nonetheless, our society has religious, cultural, and hierarchical
investments in maintaining the strict dichotomy between the sexes. Same-
sex couples, particularly in their expressions of intimacy, threaten those
investments. It is therefore only to be expected that same-sex marriage is
powerfully resisted, even if the reasons for doing so are not always fully
articulated. Inasmuch as the relational torts present a similar challenge,
judicial silence is not surprising.
II. TORT LAW (NON) TREATMENT
OF SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIPS
Three torts deal specifically with injuries to relationships: negligent
infliction of emotional distress, loss of consortium, and wrongful death. 3
This Part begins with a brief description of the history and current state of
each of these torts. Particular attention is paid to the problem that unmar-
ried opposite-sex couples have experienced in all three classes of cases.
Emphasis then moves to a discussion of the few cases involving same-sex
couples that have been decided, and the section concludes by offering some
' HIGHWATER, supra note 133, at 80.
135 Id
136 Id at 80-81.
137 The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress also covers relational
interests in cases where the extreme and outrageous conduct is directed at a third
party, and emotional distress is intentionally or recklessly caused to another person
(the plaintiff) who is present at the time. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
46(2) (1965). If the person suffering emotional distress is an immediate family
member of the victim against whom the conduct is principally directed, bodily
injury need not be shown; otherwise, bodily injury is supposed to be a prerequisite
for recovery. Id. To me, this section of the Restatement has never seemed
necessary. As long as the emotional distress is intentionally or recklessly caused
to the plaintiff, whoever that is, it is in that sense "directed" toward that plaintiff
as well as the "third person" who may be the more direct victim of it. Further
discussion of this tort, which raises substantially different issues from those
presented by the three torts under consideration here, is beyond the scope of this
Article.
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possible explanations for the virtual absence of such cases from the
reporters.
A. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
This tort, which had its genesis around the end of the nineteenth
century, has vexed courts since its inception. Reduced to essentials, the
question is whether, or under what circumstances, a defendant should be
required to compensate a plaintifffor emotional suffering that results from
negligence. One of the chief problems is judicial unease with the causal
component: judges are simply not as comfortable with the conclusion that
emotional distress has resulted from an act of negligence as they are with
the connection between impact and physical injury."' Another problem,
though, is that courts are understandably concerned about the potentially
limitless liability that could be imposed for a merely negligent act. When
a celebrity is struck by a negligent motorist and injured, should all of her
fans who suffer (some level of) emotional distress have a claim against that
motorist? Our gut feeling is that they should not, but does it then follow
that, say, her spouse should have no such claim? What about any children,
nieces and nephews, or close friends? What if the negligent motorist
narrowly misses the celebrity? Should she be ableto recover for the distress
she suffers from the close call?
The courts have responded to these complex questions incrementally
and inconsistently. The first cases to allow a claim for emotional distress
pinned liability on a showing of impact.139 In such cases, plaintiffs were
permitted to recover if the defendant had actually made contact with them,
even if such conduct resulted in no demonstrable physical injury, such as
broken bones. The impact itselfwas thought to provide a sufficiently strong
guarantee of emotional distress that courts were able to manage their
discomfort with causation. Also, permitting liability in such cases did not
extend the orbit of the defendant's liability beyond the very person whom
the defendant had struck.
138 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS §§ 10.14 - .15 (1999); John G. Culhane,
The Emperor Has No Causation: Exposing a Judicial Misconstruction ofScience,
2 WDE ER L. SYMP. J. 185, 190-92 (1997).
"a9 The most notorious case standing for this rule is Mitchell v. Rochester Ry.
Co., 45 N.E. 354 (N.Y. 1896), where the plaintiff could not recover although the
defendant's out-of-control horses surrounded her head when they stopped. The
term "claim for emotional distress" is used here as shorthand for "negligent
infliction of emotional distress."
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The next development was to allow the plaintiff to recover upon a
showing that the defendant's misconduct placed plaintiff in fear for his or
her own safety. 1 This so-called "zone of danger" rule marked an important
advance. It recognized that, even absent impact, one was quite likely to
suffer emotional distress as long as one was sufficiently close to the
accident to fear for one's own safety; i.e., in the zone of danger. Further,
the accretion of liability was slight: Even though the defendant might now
be liable to a larger group, that limit was nonetheless tightly circumscribed
by the contours of the zone of danger. Not more than a few people are
likely to be close enough to the site of an accident to harbor a real fear for
their safety; as to the others, the court could declare, as a matter of law, that
any fear they might experience would be unreasonable.
A seismic shift occurred, though, in Dillon v. Legg,4' decided by the
California Supreme Court in 1968. As is typical with cases heralding a
major change in law, the facts were sympathetic, and the result seemed
required by justice. There, a mother and a sister witnessed the gruesome
death of a third family member, a girl, at the hands of a negligent motorist.
Under prevailing law, the surviving sisterwould have had a claim while the
mother would not have. The facts made clear that the mother was too far
from the accident to fear for her own safety, whereas the sister might have
been in the zone of danger.142 This distinction the court found too fine to
support the difference in legal result, and therefore changed the law to
accommodate its sense of "natural justice."'4 In place of the zone of
danger, now characterized by the court as an "artificial island[ ] of
exception[ ],"1' the court anchored its decision in one of the central
principles of tort law: liability should be based on the foreseeability of
injury. The court was clear that foreseeability is not determinable in a given
case by reference to an arbitrary set of criteria, but did note several of the
non-exclusive factors that would aid future decision-makers in resolving the
issue: (1) whether the plaintiff was located near the accident, as opposed
to some distance from it; (2) whether there was contemporaneous observa-
4 Early cases following this rule include Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 50
N.W. 1034 (Minn. 1892); Waube v. Warrington, 258 N.W. 497 (Wis. 1935);
Dulieu v. White & Sons, 2 K.B. 669 (1901).
141 Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
1
42 1d at 914-15.
141 Id at 914.
144Id at 925.
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tion of the event; and (3) whether the plaintiff stood in a close relation to
the injured party. 45
Other courts have either followed Dillon in basing liability on the
foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, or have expressly rejected it in favor
of the easier-to-apply, liability-restricting, zone of danger rule." In
jurisdictions retaining the zone of danger rule, of course, the question of
closeness of relationship should not surface as a legal issue, because
recovery is only available to those who fear for their own safety. That fear
is unrelated to the plaintiff's relationship with the person who suffers
physical injury. Indeed, there need not even be a third party present. 47
"' Id at 920. It should be noted that recovery for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress, when based on foreseeability of harm, cannot be successfully
limited to situations involving imminent fear of physical harm. California
jurisprudence, in particular, has become convoluted by a host of decisions
attempting to decide whether a defendant who negligently causes a plaintiff's
emotional distress owes an independent duty to that person. These decisions rely
on foreseeability only inconsistently. See infra notes 343-45 and accompanying
text.
'4 In Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419 (N.Y. 1969), the New York Court
of Appeals rejected Dillon's reliance on foreseeability. In Rickey v. Chicago
Transit Auth., 457 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 1983), the Illinois Supreme Court opted for the
zone of danger rule. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 840 n.4 (2000) (citing
cases following the zone of danger rule). "Most states now appear to have joined
Dillon in rejecting the zone of danger limitation in favor of some less mechanical
limitations." Id at 840. For a list of cases that have joined Dillon, see id at 840
n.11.
" Unfortunately, the simple distinction between fearing for one's own safety
and experiencing distress because of the harm suffered by another has sometimes
been elided. For instance, in Hislop v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement &
Power Dist., 5 P.3d267, 268 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000), the Arizona Court of Appeals
upheld the grant of summary judgment against two workers who had seen their
close friend and co-worker electrocuted and killed. The co-workers were plainly
in the zone of danger: the court stated that the same "fireball" that had killed their
friend had "momentarily engulfed appellants, although they were not burned." Id
at 268. Inasmuch as they were in the zone of danger, they should have been able
to recover even under that more restrictive rule. The court, however, would not
permit recovery unless the plaintiffs were in the zone of danger andstood in a close
relationship with the decedent (and their relationship did not satisfy the latter
requirement). Id at 271-72. This approach confuses bystander cases with those in
which one experiences emotional distress because one's own physical safety is
threatened. Being "engulfed in a fireball" should qualify as such a threat! The
following statement recognizes the difference between the two kinds of
cases-recovery is proper for a "bystander to an accident or [one who] was in fear
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In jurisdictions that have adopted this more flexible foreseeability
standard in emotional distress cases, the injury for which compensation is
sought is the emotional harm caused by seeing someone else imperilled, not
the shock of being in danger oneself.'" In these cases, courts have had to
decide what is to count as a close relationship. Unfortunately, these
decisions have, retreated from the very foreseeabiity principle that
animated the expansion in the first place, by defining "close relation" in a
narrow, status-based way. Thus, with only rare exceptions, lineal relations
have been able to recover for injuries to those above or below them,
149
while even slightly more distant relations, such as first cousins, have not
been successful. 5 ' It is vital to note, therefore, that judicial denial of claims
of physical consequences to [one's] own person." Rine v. Sabo, 680 N.E.2d 647,
654 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (emphasis added).
48 If one suffers an impact, or is in the zone of danger, however, recovery for
emotional distress will not be narrowly defined to exclude the emotional distress
suffered by seeing another injured or killed. Rather, the plaintiff will simply recover
for emotional distress, whatever its source. InAlba v. Robb, 97 L. 15025 (Cook Cty.
Cir. Ct., June 18,1999), a lesbian couple's auto was struck from behind by defendant.
The surviving member of the couple "suffered fractured ribs, a concussion, and an
injury to her left shoulder that required two surgeries." Id., reported at
www.atlanet.org/homepageljOO.ht (site visited May 23,2001). She recovered about
$1 million in damages, including about $700,000 for pain and suffering. This latter
amount included recovery for posttraumatic stress disorder at seeing the death of a
"friend," but the pain and suffering damages were notbroken downmore specifically.
As the word "friend" suggests, the jury was not told of the couple's intimate
relationship. In fact, the plaintiff's attorney filed a motion in limine (which was
granted) to bar evidence referring to the plaintiff's sexual orientation. The attorney,
one Jeff Kroll, stated that the decision to file the motion resulted from focus group
work done before trial: "We learned from the focus group that the gay relationship
between [the two women] drove the verdict down." Id
149 See, e.g., Ochoa v. Superior Court, 703 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1985) (parent-child);
Dillon, 441 P.2d at 912; Mobaldi v. Bd. of Regents, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720 (Ct. App.
1976) (parent-foster child). The only appellate case involving a grandchild-
grandparent relationship is Vasquez-Gonzalez v. Superior Court, 231 Cal. Rptr.
458 (Ct. App. 1986). This case was ordered not to be officially published.
Whatever uncertainty existed regarding grandparents was cleared up by the
California Supreme Court in Thingv. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989), where
the court held that recovery in bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress
cases should, "[a]bsent exceptional circumstances, ... be limited to relatives
residing in the same household, or parents, siblings, children, and grandparents of
the victim." Id. at 829 n.10.
50 Trapp v. Schuyler Constr., 197 Cal. Rptr. 411 (Ct. App. 1983). An exception
is Kriventsov v. San Rafael Taxicabs, Inc., 229 Cal. Rptr. 768 (Ct. App. 1986),
where the uncle/nephew relationship sufficed. Since plaintiff uncle lived with his
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brought by same-sex couples might be expected not only because of courts'
usual reticence on matters of (same)-sex intimacy, but also because same-
sex couples do not have the legal status of married couples. 5 '
This point is borne out by the cases involving opposite-sex couples.
While legal spouses have recovered for injuries to the other spouse, those
in "spouse-like" relations have usually not been successful. Typical of
cases denying such claims, even where the couple's relationship was
"close" by any reasonable definition of that term, is Elden v. Sheldon.'
Elden and his unmarried cohabitant, Linda Eberling, had both been in
Eberling's car when the car was struck by defendant. Elden watched as
Eberling was thrown from the car; she died a few hours later from the
injuries caused by the impact." Under the foreseeability principle
enshrined in Dillon, decided by the same court twenty years earlier, Elden
had surely stated a claim. Indeed, the Elden court had to acknowledge both
a host of post-Dillon cases extending recovery based on "[t]he emotional
attachments of the family relationship and not legal status,"'" and Dillon's
teaching that "foreseeability of the risk [was] the 'chief element in
determining whether defendant owes a duty to... plaintiff.' "'1"
Nonetheless, the court refused to recognize the claim, ostensibly for
two reasons. First, allowing an unmarried couple to recover would "inhibit"
the "state's interest in promoting marriage. " "" Second, to permit the claim
would be unduly to burden the fact-finder, who would be called upon to
"inquire into the relationship of the partners to determine whether the
'emotional attachments of the family relationship' existed between the
parties."157 Such an inquiry would entail "a massive intrusion into the
private life of the partners," the court added.'58
As Justice Broussard pointed out in dissent, the second of these
rationales is thin, because all spousal loss of consortium cases require an
nephew, he qualifies as a proper plaintiffunder the "relatives residing in the same
household" category. See Thing, 771 P.2d at 829 n.10.
... Cf Grotts v. Zahner, 989 P.2d 415, 416 (Nev. 1999) (drawing bright-line
that limits emotional distress claims to family members).
' Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988).
1531d at 582.
14 Id at 584 (quoting Mobaldi v. Bd. of Regents, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720,726 (Ct.
App. 1976) (holding that a foster mother was permitted to recover for witnessing
child's death owing to negligently administered dose of glucose)).
55 d at 586 (quoting Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920 (Cal. 1968)).




investigation into the couple's private life, at least to the extent of
determining damages."' In fact, though, the court's concern is of a piece
with its solicitude toward marriage, which it called "at once the most
socially productive and individually fulfilling relationship that one can
enjoy in the course of a lifetime."'" Even if that proposition is true, Justice
Broussard stated, the law should not disfavor other types of relationships.
Indeed, the majority's "offensive" assumptions "ignore the reality of our
evolving social fabric and the corresponding accommodations made in both
statutory and decisional law."'' For the majority, it seems, loss of
consortium could be presumed in a marital relationship, but was otherwise
not even worth the trouble of considering.
Although denial of recovery to cohabitating, opposite-sex couples has
been the rule, a few courts have looked beyond the binary marriage/non-
marriage question, allowing recovery to couples who can establish that
their relationship is, in Justice Broussard's words, "stable and
significant."'' Courts permitting recovery on thatbasis correctly recognize
that, problems of proof notwithstanding, allowing intimate partners to
recover does not much expand the class of potential plaintiffs: each
physically injured person will have, at most, only one such partner. In the
leading case of Dunphy v. Gregor," for example, Eileen Dunphy saw her
fiance, Michael Burwell, killed when a negligent motorist slammed into
him while he was changing the tire on a friend's car. Refusing to be
constrained by the happenstance that the couple had yet to be officially
married, the court honored the bedrock tort principle that "a foreseeable
risk is the indispensable cornerstone of any... duty,"' " and noted that
difficulties in establishing the factual basis ofa claim should not operate to
bar such a claim. This enlightened decision has been followed in only a few
other cases.'" Further, as we shall see, only one reported case even
discusses whether the emotionally injured member of a same-sex couple
may recover for such distress.' It is hardly surprising that the case was
unsuccessful.
159 Id at 592-93 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
160 Id. at 586.
1 Id at 592 (Broussard, ., dissenting).
'Id (Broussard, J., dissenting); accordLedger v. Tippitt, 210 Cal. Rptr. 814
(Ct. App. 1985). The majority in Elden disapproved of the result in Ledger. Elden,
758 P.2d at 585-86.
' Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372 (N.J. 1994).
164 Id at 376. As discussed infra Part M.B., the court understood that fore-
seeabillty is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to the imposition of liability.
" See, e.g., Smith v. Bell Sports, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 70,77 (W.D.N.Y. 1996).
'6 See infra Part II.D. 1.
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B. Loss of Consortum
Unlike negligent infliction of emotional distress, the tort of loss of
consortium has been long recognized by courts, dating back at least as far
as 1618.167 Such early birth means that the tort was grounded in an element
of "hard" damages that were more easily proven than the emotional
suffering that courts had historically been loathe to acknowledge.' Thus,
although the term "loss of consortium" has come to mean the loss of
spousal "sex, society and service," at its inception the tort covered only the
loss of service a husband suffered via injury to his wife, or to one or more
of his children. 69 Indeed, the tort-per quod consortium amisit-was
expressly analogized to the cause of action a man had for the loss of a
servant's services-per quod servitium-through the tortious conduct of
/mother.'70 The family was viewed as an economic unit, so that injury to
any member upset the assignment of tasks, thereby injuring the whole. The
husband/father, as legal and social ruler of the family, held the cause of
action. Indeed, the other family members, like servants, were the legal
property of the patriarch. A corollary, of course, is that the wife had no
claim for the loss of her husband's service.'
This view of the family has mostly disappeared from American life."t
As it waned, a corresponding transformation took place with loss of
'
67 Guy v. Livesey, 79 Eng. Rep. 428 (K.B. 1618), reprinted in PETER B.
KUTNER & OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., ADVANCED TORTS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 9 (2d ed. 1997). For a summary of the origin and meaning of the claim,
see id at 11-12 nn.l-2.
I" Thus, even the tort of assault was originally recognized as a means of pre-
venting furtherbreaches of the peace, not so much as a vehicle for redressing injury
caused by apprehension of imminent contact. See Richard N. Pearson, Liability to
Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Harm--A Comment on the Nature
ofArbitrwy Rules, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 477,486 (1982).
'See KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 125, at 931,934.
170 See, e.g., Guevin v. Manchester St. Ry., 99 A. 298, 300-04 (N.H. 1916)
(discussing the similarities and differences between the two causes of action).
1 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 125, at 931.
11 Although it would seem hard to believe that anyone today would regard a
wife as the property of the husband, some do advocate the "next best
thing"--traditional assignment of roles, with women invariably remaining at home
to raise the children (which are presumed to exist) while their bread-winning
husbands earn the family's income. See, e.g., Robert Dreyfuss, The Holy War On
Gays, ROLLING STONE, Mar. 18, 1999, at 38, 39 (quoting Robert Knight of the
Family Research Council, who warned that "America's 'man-based culture' could
shudder and fall with the advent of a sexual revolution brought about by gays. 'As
man is reduced in stature, all hell will break loose.' ").
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consortium. First, it broadened to include the less-tangible aspects of the
spousal relation that unquestionably suffer when one member is injured.
Thus, husbands began to recover for the loss of the wife's "society," or
affection, and sexual intimacy. By the beginning of the twentieth century,
the service element had been all but bleached out of the tort, leaving mostly
the now-central intangible injury to the relation. By that same time, the
wife, having become a recognizable legal entity, also had her own claim for
the loss of a husband's consortium.ln
The new logic of the tort, though, means that it is not so neatly cabined
by the legal entity of marriage; even if sexual intimacy is defined as
essential to the tort, 74 such intimacy is neither present in all marriages, nor
absent outside of its confines. Perhaps forecasting the tort's growth as a
result of its less economically bound definition, a few courts and legisla-
tures have taken the bold step of eliminating loss of consortium
completely. 75 In retrospect, other courts probably wish they had done away
with the tort while they had the chance. Those that have retained it have
had to deal with the problem that the injury for which loss of consortium
now compensates is foreseeably suffered not only by a husband or a wife,
but also by unmarried intimates. Most of the challenging cases have
involved cohabitating intimates, sometimes of long-standing, sometimes
engaged to be married. Courts have thus had to face the stark choice of
whether strictly to require marriage.
A few early cases were sympathetic to injured intimates, permitting
recovery outside of marriage. A leading case was Butcher v. Superior
Court, 6 in which the court's adherence to the foundational precepts oftort
led it to extend recovery to unmarried cohabitants who could demonstrate
"7 This victory was the outcome ofchanges in state laws that are known collec-
tively as the Married Women's Acts. See KUTNER & REYNOLDS, supra note 167,
at 12 n.5.
"' In Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858, 863-64 (Cal. 1977), the
California Supreme Court strongly suggestedthat sexual intimacy is essential to the
tort, as it relied on the absence of such intimacy in the parent-child relationship to
distinguish-and deny-the whole class of claims for loss ofparental consortium.
'" The most interesting development inthis regard is the statutory demise of the
tort in Great Britain, its nation of origin. Administration of Justice Act, 1982, c. 53,
§ 2 (Eng.); see also Wollam v. Kennecott Corp., 648 F. Supp. 160 (D. Utah 1986)
(discussing Utah law's apparent refusal to recognize the tort); Tondre v.
Thurmond-Hollis-Thurmond, Inc., 706 P.2d 156 (N.M. 1985) (explaining New
Mexico's failure to recognize the tort), overruled by Romero v. Byers, 872 P.2d
840 (N.M. 1994).
176 Butcher v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503 (Ct. App. 1983); see also
Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1078 (D.NJ. 1980).
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that their relationship had the characteristics of a legally recognized
marriage. The court stated that, with the basis of the tort now firmly
anchored in the loss of intimacy that serious injury visits on the couple,
tying recovery to marriage is no longer defensible.'" This modest move
toward recognition of actual loss was quickly blocked, however. In Elden
v. Sheldon,"8 discussed above in connection with negligent infliction of
emotional distress, the California Supreme Court referred the reader to
"some of the factors recited... in [its] discussion of... negligent infliction
of emotional distress"'79 in denying the consortium claim. The same
concerns about promoting marriage and "the difficulty of assessing the
emotional, sexual and financial relationship ofcohabitating parties"'80 were
now welded to "the virtual absence of authority to support plaintiffs
position."'
At first blush, the marriage requirement might seem to make somewhat
more sense in the loss of consortium context than it does in negligent
infliction of emotional distress cases. Courts in the emotional distress cases
began from first principles in extending recovery to those in "close
relationships," an open-ended term that would only have been coined by a
court comfortable with the similarly flexible concept of foreseeability.'
In loss of consortium cases, by contrast, a strict, family-based definition
was midwifed along with the tort. This sort of thinking impelled the
decision in Leonardis v. Morton Chemical Co., another case involving
unmarried cohabitants, where the New Jersey appellate court held that loss
of consortium "is founded upon the marriage relation. Absent such
relationship, the right does not exist."' 84 It is significant that a recent federal
district court decision applying New Jersey law quoted this language in
1996,"u even after that state's binding decision in Dunphy v.
'7 Butcher, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 509-11.
" Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988). The case is discussed in detail
in supra Part II.A.
179 Elden, 758 P.2d at 589.
180 Id
11Id
3As Justice Broussard pointed out in his dissenting opinion in Elden, "[t]he
parties' closeness is only pertinent to foreseeability; once foreseeability is
established, the nature of their relationship has no logical connection to the
plaintiffs legal standing." Id at 591 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
" Leonardis v. Morton Chem. Co., 445 A.2d 45 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1982).
'uId at 45 (emphasis added).
135 Smith v. Bell Sports, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 70, 79 (W.D.N.Y. 1996).
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Gregor'"6 -some twelve years after Leonardis-permitting unmarried
cohabitants to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Rather
than read Dunphy's broad language and logic to encompass loss of
consortium, the court in Smith v. Bell Sports, Inc.8' was terse and
dismissive, even though the case also involved a good claim (post-Dunphy)
for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Despite the superficial appeal of the marriage requirement for loss of
consortium cases, the logic of tort drives toward a different result.
Whatever may have been the case hundreds of years ago, there is no
escaping that the bundle of interests that it now protects is neither
germinated nor limited by marriage. This is obviously true of society and
sexual intimacy, but it may, in a given case, also be true of whatever
remains ofthe service component. Although the majority inElden is correct
in pointing out that marriage creates legal rights and responsibilities,
unmarried cohabitants may assume many of the same responsibilities, and
so should be accorded corresponding rights."3 Indeed, the court inadver-
tently acknowledges as much in citing the hallmark case of Marvin v.
Marvin, 189 in which the California Supreme Court held enforceable express
and implied promises of division of property and support. Marvin exposes
the question-begging approach in Elden: the issue is not whether marriage
creates certain rights and responsibilities, but whether such rights are
necessarily restricted to married couples. Since Marvin itself shows that
they are not," the better approach would be to carefully consider whether
anything intrinsic to marriage requires the court to award it special status
in the context of decision. In tort, elevating static, status-based definitions
over the "facts of life" is particularly problematic, as Justice Cardozo
pointed out more than sixty years ago."'
One possible distinction between cases such as Marvin and these
relational torts ends up supporting tort recovery, even if the opposite
'" Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372 (N.J. 1994).
187 Smith, 934 F. Supp. at 70.
"' One caveat here is that not all of the responsibilities attendant to marriage
can be assumed outside of it. While the incompleteness of this package of
responsibilities gives plausibility (but not more) to the argument that marriage
should be required for loss of consortium, fairness dictates that it have no similar
effect in the case of same-sex couples who, denied the right to marry, create the
best legal approximation of marital responsibilities available to them. For a fuller
discussion of this point, see infra Part II.D.
s Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
'oSee also supra Part I.B. and cases discussed therein.
.91See Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98, 104 (1934).
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conclusion might at first suggest itself. In contract cases such as Marvin,
the agreement bound only the two principals, whereas loss of consortium
affects a third party-the tort defendant. But courts have granted rights to
same-sex couples in other contexts even where doing so has adversely
affected the rights of a third party."9 Once the categorical approach is
rejected, the question becomes whether imposing a cost on a third party is
fair. It was fair in the rent-control context of Braschi, at least in part,
because the landlord should have expected that, given the statute even
before the current regulations went into effect, the benefits of rent control
would be passed along to someone upon the tenant's death. Given the
slightly larger class of possible beneficiaries imposed by permitting
unmarried, but cohabitating, surviving intimates to accede to these benefits,
and the hardship that would be imposed on the survivor were the court to
have held for the landlord, the balance of equities favored the tenant. Much
the same can be said in favor of recovery by unmarried intimates in loss of
consortium and negligent infliction of emotional distress cases. Even
unsympathetic courts agree with the proposition that a negligent defendant
can foresee a loss of consortium, or an emotional injury, to an intimate
companion of the physically injured victim. Thus, allowing such plaintiffs
to recover extends liability only slightly, since there will be only one
plaintiff standing in that class in any one case. If it is argued that the
defendant would not have been liable at all if the court disallows the claim,
the argument has come full circle, because the question is whether the
claim should be disallowed.
C. Wrongful Death Claims
The common law did not recognize death as a compensable event.
Thus, the negligently (or, for that matter, intentionally) caused death of
another human being brought no tort liability, while even slight injury
wouldresult in such liability. This bizarre and counterintuitive result 93 was
probably the result of the common law's close association, if not confusion,
between criminal and civil law. As the court stated in Huggins v.
Butcher, I" a case involving a wife's death from an assault by defendant, "if
192 See, e.g., Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 543 N.E.2d49 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that
surviving partner of a same-sex relationship is not precluded, as a-matter of law,
from seeking noneviction protection).
193 See EPSTEIN, supra note 138, at 454: "How this sad state of affairs demon-
strates the efficiency of the (early) common law is anyone's guess."
"9 1 Brownl. & Golds. 205 (1606), reprinted in KUTNER& REYNOLDS, supra
note 167, at 56.
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one beats the servant [or wife] ... so that [s]he die of the beating, the
master shall not have an action ... for the battery and loss of service,
because... it is now become an offence against the Crown, and turned into
felony, and this hath drowned the particular offence." 95 The odd result of
this rule was that defendants who caused death were insufficiently deterred
by tort law from their negligent acts." 6 Although the criminal law provides
its own deterrence, there was something to the observation that this rule
made it more profitable for defendants to "finish off their victims" than to
leave a potential plaintiff alive. 97 With few exceptions, the rule obtained
in the United States 9' as well as in England.
Taking their cue from the statutory repeal of this inane doctrine in
England,' the very nation of its birth, each of the United States has by
now created a statutory remedy for fatal injuries.2" These statutes define
the kinds of damages for which recovery may be sought and the plaintiffs
who have standing to bring suit.2"' Although the issue of standing is of
195 Id.
" A related question that arises is whether sufficient deterrence might be found
in the deceased victim's own action, now passed along to his or her estate. First,
as the quoted text suggests, the common law rules barred not only a claim for the
death itself, but also extinguished any already-existing claims for harm suffered by
the victim before death. So-called survival statutes have by now been enacted in
virtually every common law jurisdiction that "breathe fresh life" into such claims.
A useful statement of the current status of the law, with appropriate citations, is
found in KUTNER & REYNOLDS, supra note 167, at 60-61 n.3. Survival statutes
alone do not provide much deterrence, however, when the defendant's negligence
causes the immediate death of the plaintiff, because there may be no pain, and there
will be no medical expenses, lost wages, etc. Similarly, loss of consortium claims
compensate for the loss of society of a spouse who is alive, but seriously
injured-there is no consortium "missing" when the spouse dies. As we shall see,
however, the loss of consortium for what should have been the decedent's lifespan
is compensable under some wrongful death statutes.
Borer v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858, 865 (Cal. 1977).
198 Long before attaining statehood, Hawaii, under certain circumstances,
recognized a common law action for wrongful death. See Hall v. Kennedy, 27 Haw.
626, 628 (1923) (describing the circumstances in which Hawaiian courts
recognized a cause ofaction forwrongful death). The United States Supreme Court
accepted a common law action as well in the maritime context, but not until it had
before it a wealth of wrongful death statutes it could look to in support of the
principle that negligently caused death should be a compensable event. Moragne
v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
'9 Lord Campbell's Act, 9 & 10 Vict. C. 93 (1846).200 See EPSTEIN, supra note 138, at 453-55.
20o See DOBBS, supra note 146, at 813-15 (discussing parties named as potential
statutory beneficiaries in the suit); id at 807-13 (discussing damages available).
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more interest for present purposes, a word on the issue of recoverable
damages is in order. The older approach, still in effect in some jurisdic-
tions, is to limit recovery to "pecuniary losses." 2' This term generally
includes the economic benefitthat the plaintiffexpected to receive from the
defendant overthe course ofthe decedent's expected lifetime, but has often
been interpreted broadly to include such intangible "services" as instruc-
tion, guidance and nurturing. In Gaydos v,. Domabyl,"3 for example, the
court stated that "pecuniary loss" in the case of a mother with both adult
and minor children would properly include "indefinable acts of tender
solicitude, frugality, industry, usefulness, and attention.!2'6 Would such an
approach be broad enough to take in loss of consortium? In the absence of
specific statutory language on point, courts have been divided on the
issue. 5 A few states make explicit that loss of consortium is covered; in
Alaska, for instance, the court orjury, in fixing damages, "shall consider
... loss of consortium."2 6 Similarly, Florida includes among the surviving
spouse's compensable damages "loss of the decedent's companionship," '2 7
and Hawaii covers all bases by allowing recovery for the "[l]oss of society,
companionship, comfort, consortium, or protection."'20
Inasmuch as the action for wrongful death is statutory, one might
expect "cleaner" answers than the common law provides on the question of
who may be entitled to recover. Indeed, the statutes are quite specific in
defining their potential beneficiaries. In so doing, they exhibit some
variation from state to state. All of those that name their beneficiaries begin
with "spouse" (or some more gender-specific words), 9 and then may move
202See id at 807-13 (citing statutes).
203 Gaydos v. Domabyl, 152 A. 549 (Pa. 1930).
2041d at 554.
20' Compare Sedillo v. City of Flagstaf& 737 P.2d 1377 (Ariz. App. 1987)
(allowing damages for loss of companionship), with Laddv. Douglas Trucking Co.,
523 A.2d 1301 (Conn. 1987) (answering "no" to certified question of whether
spouse can recover damages for postmortem loss of consortium).206 ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.580(cX4) (Michie 2000) (emphasis added).
207 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.21(2) (West 1997).
208 HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-3(b)(1) (Supp. 1999). Hawaii's recent domestic
partnership legislation extends wrongful death actions to same-sex couples. See
infra Part H.D.
209 See, e.g., ARIZ. STAT. § 12-612 (2000) ("surviving husband or wife" has a
cause of action); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 377.60(a) (West 1998) (action for
"surviving spouse"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3724(a) (1998) ("action... for the
benefit of the spouse"); IDAHO CODE § 5-31 1(2)(b) (Michie 1998) (action for
"decedent's spouse"); IND. CODEANN. § 34-23-1-1 (Michie 1998) ("damages...
inure to the... benefit of the widow or widower"); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §
411.130(2)(a) (Michie 1998) (action on behalf of "widow or husband").
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to offspring,210 parents,211 siblings,212 and then to other next of kin, as
defined by the state law of intestacy. The statutes may either name the
beneficiaries as above, or may refer to the intestate distribution law of the
state.
213
Another small group of statutes permits beneficiaries named in the
deceased's will to recover against the tortfeasor, but only with substantial
qualifications and limitations. Typically, such recovery is only possible in
the unusual case where none of the beneficiaries named in the statute
survive.2 14 Accordingly, those who take under the will generally do not
qualify for wrongful death's substantial benefits. Some states, however,
permit certain specified classes of damages to be distributed directly to the
210 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3724(a) (1998) (action for the benefit
of a child of the deceased person); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-23-1-1 (Michie 1998)
(damages to "dependent children"); IowA CODE. ANN. § 633.336 (West 1998)
(damages "apportioned... among the surviving spouse and children of the
descendent");KY. REV. STAT.ANN. § 411.130(2)(b) (Michie 1998) (statute divides
recovery between surviving "widow or husband" and children according to a
formula, and not according to the real loss each might have suffered).
211 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-102(d) (Michie 1998) ("father and
mother" have a cause of action); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3724(a) (1998)
("parent" has a cause of action); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.130(d) (Michie 1998)
("mother and father of the deceased" have a claim only if the deceased leaves no
"widow, husband, or child.").
212 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-102 (Michie 1998) (claim for "brothers
and sisters" of the deceased); MCH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2922 (West 1998)
(comprehensive statute takes in "spouse, children, descendants, parents,
grandparents, brothers and sisters"); MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-13 (1998) ("sister,
or brother" appear at the end of a list of those who may recover).
213 Some do both, as by specifically naming some of the beneficiaries, and then
declaring the rest eligible to recover under the law of intestacy. Maryland does this
by creating two categories. First come primary beneficiaries ('wife, husband,
parent, and child"). Ifthere are no such survivors, the secondary beneficiaries ("any
person[s] related to the deceased person by blood or marriage who was
substantially dependent upon the deceased") can recover. MD. CODE ANN., Crs.
& JUD. PROC. § 3-904(a), (b) (1998). Kansas takes a simpler approach, allowing
an action to any "heirs at law of the deceased who has sustained a loss by reason
of the death." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1902 (1994).
214 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-612 (2000) (distribution to surviving
spouses, children, or parents; if none of these exist, those entitled to take under the
will may bring suit); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-6 (2000) (in addition to named
beneficiaries, anyone who was "financially dependent" on the decedent entitled to
damages; if none of the named survivors exist, proceeds of wrongful death are
"distributed in accordance with the decedent's will").
[VOL. 89
2000-20011 SAME-SEX COUPLES AND TORT LAW 957
estate. Generally speaking, such damages are limited to out-of-pocket costs,
such as medical expenses incurred by the decedent before death and funeral
expenses, that would otherwise be the responsibility of the estate to pay215
Such recovery simply transfers the costs from the estate to the tortfeasor,
thereby "softening the blow" that would be struck by permitting the
defendant to avoid paying even those costs most directly attributable to the
culpable conduct.
Because the statutes define the potential beneficiaries with such
precision, there are only a few cases in which unmarried cohabitants have
even sought recovery for wrongful death, and hints from other cases
suggest that they have little reason to be optimistic. In denying recovery to
unmarried cohabitants for loss of consortium and negligent infliction of
emotional distress, courts often cite the state's refusal to grant similar rights
under wrongful death statutes as evidence that state policy disfavors these
common-law claims as well. In Elden v. Sheldon,216 for example, the
California Supreme Court listed the state's wrongful death statutes among
a host of laws conferring unique benefits on married couples. Although
such cases do not directly answer the question of whether wrongful death
statutes might be invoked by surviving unmarried intimates, they effec-
tively discourage such claims from even being brought.
Nonetheless, ahandful of decisions squarely address whether opposite-
sex, unmarried cohabitants might be entitled to recover under wrongful
death statutes. One plaintiff's tactic, thus far unsuccessful, has been to try
to avoid the wrongful death statute entirely, by casting the complaint under
a different legal theory. In Matu v. Gerardin Corp.,217 the camouflage was
easily pierced, because the surviving partner alleged loss of consortium.
This tort, however, is only appropriate where the plaintiffs partner survives
the injury; when death results, wrongful death is the proper claim."' In this
2"5 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 768.21 (2000) (ifno child or spouse survives, estate's
personal representative may bring action to recover funeral expenses and medical
costs, as well as decedent's lost earnings until his or her death); 740 ILL. CON.
STAT. 180/2 (2000) (spouse or children may bring action, but if neither survives,
personal representative can bring suit only to recover medical costs incurred before
death and burial expenses); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-23-1-1 (2000) (same).216Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988).
Matuz v. Gerardin Corp., 254 Cal. Rptr. 725 (Ct. App. 1989).
218 Claims arise in which the injured party survives for a time, then dies of the
injuries incurred by the negligence. In such cases, the survivor has a loss of
consortium claim for the period of time before death, and a wrongful death claim
for the death itself. A good discussion of the point is found in Ladd v. Douglas
Trucking Co., 523 A.2d 1301, 1302 (Conn. 1987).
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case, death had been immediate. Plaintiffand her companion had both been
involved in an airplane crash. She survived, but witnessed his gruesome
death. The facts alleged sufficient intimacy (cohabitation for five years
with plans to marry; exclusive sexual relations; and a" 'high degree of
economic cooperation and entanglement' "), but the court affirmed
dismissal of the claim.
Similarly, in Nieto v. City ofLos Angeles,"9 plaintiff, whose intended
spouse was "recklessly shot and killed" by a Los Angeles police officer,20
was not able to avoid disqualification under the wrongful death statute by
casting her complaint as "quasi-intentional interference with contractual
relations, negligence and breach of warranty." 1 The "contract" in issue
was an oral agreement between the two intimates to marry; the wedding
was to have taken place justfour days after the shooting occurred.' On
appeal, plaintiff was forced to concede that the claim was in fact one for
wrongful death, and that, under a literal reading of the statute, she could not
recover. ' The court declined to read the law more broadly, instead leaning
on standard language tying marriage to the acceptance of responsibilities
that are simply not present in "meretricious" relationships 24 This
observation was particularly inapt in the case before the court, as the
couple's imminent marriage was driven, at least in part, by their willingness
to assume such responsibilities. Less than four months before decedent's
death, plaintiff had given birth to a child that the decedent had acknowl-
edged as his natural daughter. 25 Thus, the marriage was intended to
"legitimize" the couple in the eyes of the law, and to cement the responsi-
bility that the two must have felt they owed each other. The court's broad
brush-off simply did not fit the facts."2 6
Occasionally, though, a surviving unmarried companion does bring a
wrongful death claim without seeking cover. One good example of why this
strategy is not pursued more often is Roe v. Ludtke Trucking, Inc. 7 There,
2t9 Nieto v. City of Los Angeles, 188 Cal. Rptr. 31 (Ct. App. 1982).




224 1d at 35.
2id at 32.
2 By the facts, I mean the facts alleged. The promise to marry was oral, so it
might be difficult to prove at trial. Absent such proof, the case for assumption of
responsibility weakens considerably. Nonetheless, plaintiff should have the right
to prove the case, perhaps by calling witnesses who knew of the promise.
'7 Roe v. Ludtke Trucking, Inc., 732 P.2d 1021 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
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the surviving intimate, Kathryn Roe, had lived with the decedent, Stephen
Tibbetts, for some thirteen years. As the court stated, it was "undisputed
that they shared a long-term, stable, and marital-like relationship." '
Nonetheless, the Washington wrongful death statute, which listed "wife"
among its beneficiaries, offered nothing to Roe. Her argument, simply
stated, was that the wrongful death statute, created to remedy a deficiency
in the common law, should be read liberally so as to define her as a "wife"
based on the reality of her relationship with Tibbetts. The court took a pass
on the issue of how liberally the statute should be read, finding that under
no construction of the statute could Roe prevail: "Since the term 'wife' is
not defined in the statute, it should be given its plain... meaning, which
may be determined by resort to dictionaries." ' Turning then to whichever
unspecified edition of Webster'sNew Collegiate Dictionary was handy, the
court noted that under "the only definition of the word relevant here, ... a
'wife' is a 'married woman.' ,23 0
This definition of "wife" is consistent with the Tenth Edition of the
same dictionary, but, since the court was relying on dictionary definitions
rather than the overall statutory scheme, it should have gone further to
examine the word "married." According to the Tenth Edition, one of the
two definitions of married is "united, joined.""2 Under a reasonable
interpretation of those defining words, Roe and Tibbetts were "married."
This semantic exercise is not meant to suggest that the court misinterpreted
the statute. Indeed, even if the term "wife" is nowhere defined specifically
in the Washington code, it is likely that the term, as used throughout,
necessarily implies a relation of legal marriage. The point is that the court's
result-driven agenda led it to a somewhat sloppy analysisl 3
22 Id at 1022.
" Id at 1023 (citation omitted).
230 Id
3 According to that source, one definition of wife is "a female partner in a
marriage." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATEDICTIONARY 1353 (10th ed. 1998).
732 Id. at 713.
13 It should also be noted that the court also considered the argument that, even
ifplaintiffcould not recover under the statute, she should prevail under a common
law theory. The support for that argument was derived from the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Moragne v. States Marine Line, Inc., 398 U.S. 375
(1970), where the Court avoided an unintended lacuna in coverage between
maritime law and state law by recognizing a common law remedy for wrongful
death. Id at 402-03. Whether or not this result is defensible, the Washington
court's decision not to allow a common law remedy seems to me correct. If it is
clear that the state intended to exclude unmarried cohabitants from recovery, then,
absent a successful constitutional challenge, the court is bound to honor legislative
2000-2001]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
One final point about Roe is worth making: The court, ip a long
footnote, stated that it was not deciding whether it would recognize a claim
for loss of consortium when the injury does not result in the death of the
cohabitant. The court noted that while "a few courts have looked favorably
on such a cause of action," "[tihe vast majority" have not. 24 Again, this
suggested willingness to at least entertain a loss of consortium claim
underscores the near-impossibility of prevailing in wrongful death cases,
where the legislature has spoken with a clear voice.
D. Same-Sex Couples and the Relational Torts: A Clanging Silence
Given the difficulty that unmarried, opposite-sex couples face in these
relational torts, one would hardly expect same-sex couples to be more
successful. As demonstrated in Part I, supra, courts are uncomfortable with
sexual intimacy-especially intimacy between two members of the same
sex. Inasmuch as the relational torts, like same-sex marriage, offer no
refuge from the issue of intimacy, judicial lack of sympathy is quite
predictable.
Nonetheless, one might at least expect a developing body of case law
on these torts, because one powerful argument is available to same-sex
couples that unmarried opposite-sex couples do not have: same-sex couples
are not legally permitted to be married. Grist for such an argument might
be derived from the court's observation in Sykes v. Propane Power
Corp.,3 5 that unmarried opposite-sex couples cannot claim they are
unconstitutionally discriminated against, because they "voluntarily choose
not to marry." 6 Justice Broussard made the point explicitly in his dissent
in Elden v. Sheldon: "Clearly the state's interest in marriage is not
advanced by precluding recovery to couples who could not in any case
choose marriage. The categorical exclusion of same-sex couples particu-
larly highlights the injustice of an approach that recognizes only those
commitments ratified by the state." 7 This point has been emphasized in
intent. It is worth noting, though, that the court's unwillingness to read the statute
broadly stands in contrast to the hard work that some courts have done to avoid the
statutory language in the "stepparent cases." See supra Part I.C. This difference
underscores courts' commitment to the best interests of children.
2 Roe, 732 P.2d at 1024 n.3.
235 Sykes v. Propane Power Corp., 541 A.2d 271 (N.J. Super. CL App. Div.
1988).
2 6 Id at 279.
237 Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 592 n.2 (Cal. 1988) (Broussard, J., dis-
senting); see also Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909,
952 n.7 (Kennard, J., dissenting in part) (in a case involving whether a religious
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two recent dissenting opinions. In Hislop v. SaltRiver ProjectAgricultural
Improvement & Power District, Judge Garbarino, in dissent, borrowed
language from dissenting Chief Justice Rose of the Nevada Supreme Court
in Grotts v. Zahner. 9 In decrying the majority's denial of a claim brought
by co-workers and close friends of a man electrocuted in their presence,
Judge Garbarino noted that the bright-line status rule creates unfairness to
gays and lesbians in committed relationships. They will be "denied the right
to even claim damages for emotional distress for witnessing injury or death
to their partner for no other reason than that they are not legally married,
a status they cannot prevent."2 °
This observation also eliminates one of the earlier-discussed objections
to extending the tort: Only those couples willing to assume the responsibili-
ties attendant to legal marriage should receive the "right" to sue for
relational injury.24' As applied to same-sex couples, at least, that scruple
should be overcome where the couple's commitment to each other mirrors
that of opposite-sex couples, except for the legal disqualification from
marriage.242 Such commitment might be demonstrated in any of the host of
ways that unmarried opposite-sex couples have emphasized in seeking
judicial recognition of their lost relational interest: maintaining one
residence; partially or completely merging finances; being recognized as
exemption from a state housing anti-discrimination statute should be afforded a
landlord who did not believe in unmarried cohabitation, Justice Kennard stated that
"[a]nalysis of whether there is a compelling interest in eliminating discrimination
against homosexual couples may well involve different considerations; [for]
homosexual couples ... unmarried status is not a matter of voluntary choice").
8 H -islop v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 5 P.3 d 267,
276 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (Garbarino, J., dissenting), review denied, 18 P.3d 1230
(Ariz. 2001).
I9 Grotts v. Zahner, 989 P.2d 415, 417 (Nev. 1999) (Rose, C.J., dissenting).
240 Hislop, 5 P.3d at 276 (Garbarino, J., dissenting) (quoting Grotts, 989 P.2d
at 418 (Rose, C.J., dissenting)). It is also worth noting the court's statement that
certain family relationships-thiose "beyond the first degree of consanguinity,"
Grotts, 989 P.2d at 416 n.1, could be considered on a case-by-case basis, but that
"any non family 'relationship' fails, as a matter of law, to qualify for NIED
[negligent infliction of emotional distress] standing." Id at 416. In Grotts, the
plaintiff was a woman who had seen her fiance killed in an accident
2 Nieto v. City of Los Angeles, 188 Cal. Rptr. 31, 35 (Ct. App. 1982).
242 Such a mirror-image view, though, relies on an understanding that the
intimate and committed lives of gay and lesbian people are just as valuable as those
of opposite-sex couples. Elsewhere, I have said that "'commitment' is not
understood by the dominant society in the same way when it comes to gay people
... who are not valued members of society in the first place." Culhane, Uprooting
the Arguments, supra note 22, at 1190.
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the beneficiary of one's partner's insurance benefits; being named in the
other's will; adopting children together, or serving as foster parents; and
being recognized by others as a couple.
In addition, at least some same-sex couples would also be able to point
to theirceremonialmarriages, whether recognized by a given religious faith
or group, or not.243 In jurisdictions that permit couples to register as
domestic partners, such status would further indicate "couplehood." So
would traveling to Vermont to enter into a civil union 2 " Opposite-sex
couples might also opt for one of these putative marriage surrogates, but,
for at least two reasons, the fit is not as good. First, each is less available
to opposite-sex couples than to same-sex couples. In some places, opposite-
sex couples are not eligible to register as domestic partners.24 Similarly,
even a church willing to recognize the committed, loving relationship
between two members of the same sex might well balk at extending similar
approbation to an opposite-sex couple that could (and should, in the
church's eyes) marry. These observations suggest the second "fit" problem
with these options, as applied to opposite sex couples: Since they can
choose to marry, courts can and do focus on the decision not to do so in
denying recovery. The difference might be expressed as follows: Since
same-sex couples cannot marry, approximating that favored state to the
extentthe law allows mightengenderjudicial sympathy, while opposite-sex
couples who spurn that option may be (and have been) "punished" for
making the court's task more difficult.2' These arguments and observations
243 In THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, Professor Eskridge presents
examples of the text of same-sex commitment ceremonies. ESKRIDGE, supra note
28, at 193-217.
244 The Vermont civil union law expressly permits out-of-staters to enter into
a civil union in Vermont. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 78, § 5160(a) (2000). What effect
doing so will have in other states is yet unknown.
24 See, e.g., HAW. REv. STAT. § 572C-4(3) (Supp. 1999) (to qualify forbenefits
under reciprocal beneficiary law, parties mustbe "legally prohibited from marrying
one another"); see also Philadelphia's "life partnership" ordinance, which restricts
that status to "two unmarried individuals of the same gender." Phila., Pa.,
Ordinance Bill 970750 (1998).
246 The closer analogy might be between same-sex couples who seek the best
available approximation of marriage and opposite-sex couples who are engaged to
be married. At the point of engagement, the parties are signaling--often
publicly-a willingness to accept the responsibilities attendantto marriage. Indeed,
in Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 373 (N.J. 1994), the successful plaintiffinthe
negligent infliction of emotional distress suit had been engaged to marry the
decedent, a point that the court made in the very first sentence of its factual
discussion. On the other hand, the couple's engagement ("contract to marry") did
not move the court to grant recovery in Nieto, even though the circumstances
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might or might not be appealing to courts, but they are supported by
sufficient logic and sympathy to commend to same-sex intimates the effort
of making them.
Nonetheless, and likely for the reasons developed throughout this
Article, I have been able to unearth only three cases that even address
relational loss to same-sex couples: one negligent infliction of emotional
distress case, and two wrongful death cases.247 No loss of consortium cases
involving same sex-couples have been found. The remainder of this section
is structured as follows: First, I analyze these three cases. Then, I offer
some further possible reasons for the almost complete lack of case law in
this area.
1. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
Coon v. Joseph,24 handed down in 1987, was decided in the final year
of the high-water era for unmarried couples in California. Since Dillon v.
Legg's pronouncement, in 1968, that foreseeability was to be the touch-
stone of liability in negligent infliction of emotional distress cases,249 at
least one appellate court had allowed unmarried, opposite-sex cohabitants
to state a claim for such distress." ° In 1988, though, the California Supreme
Court decided Elden v. Sheldon, disqualifying unmarried couples from
claims for both loss of consortium and negligent infliction of emotional
distress."51 The following year, Thing v. La Chusa hollowed out Dillon's
core, converting its foreseeability factors-particularly contemporaneous-
ness of observation and close relationship--into requirements, and defining
with specificity the class of eligible plaintiffs." But in 1987, a same-sex
couple might have been forgiven for believing that a court might take
seriously Dillon's insistence that liability follow foreseeable risk.
strongly suggested that the "contract" was made expressly to assume the
responsibilities attendant to raising a child. See supra notes 219-26 and accom-
panying text.
247 Sharon Smith's case has been filed, but, as of this writing, no disposition of
any kind has been made.
SCoon v. Joseph, 237 Cal. Rptr. 873 (Ct. App. 1987).
Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 919 (Cal. 1968).
250 Ledger v. Tippitt, 210 Cal. Rptr. 814 (Ct. App. 1985). The Ledger court
denied claims for wrongful death and loss ofconsortium, however. Id at 817,822.
In Butcher v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503 (Ct. App. 1983), a loss of
consortium claim had been permitted.
2s Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988).




Plaintiff Gary Coon and his "intimate male friend" (to use the court's
term), one Ervin, were attempting to board a municipal bus in San
Francisco when the bus driver, defendant Michael Joseph, allegedly
"verbally abused Ervin and struck his face. When [Coon] observed the
assault on his friend, he suffered great... emotional distress."253 Coon
sought relief under several causes of action, including intentional and
negligent infliction of emotional distress. The lower court dismissed
the entire complaint, and the Court of Appeal for the First District
affirmed.255
The problem with the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim,
said the court, was that, as a matter of law, the parties could not establish
the "close relation" required by Dlon' In so deciding, the court avoided
addressing the strength of the relationship. Coon alleged that he and Ervin
had an "intimate, stable and 'emotionally significant' relationship as
'exclusive life partners,"' 257 and that the two had been living together for
a year. Given the sketchiness of the court's description, it is difficult to
assess whether Coon and Ervin had the sort of long-term, committed
relationship that might serve as a"substitute" for marriage by a sympathetic
court. The court's approach, though, made a fuller description unneces-
sary.
A benign reading of the decision is that the court was simply more
comfortable with a bright-line rule. Indeed, the court cited a number of
cases interpreting the close relationship requirement narrowly, as requir-
ing either husband-wife, parent-child, or grandchild-grandparent.25
The two, or maybe three,259 cases to the contrary were regarded as
25' Coon v. Joseph, 237 Cal. Rptr. 873, 874 (Ct. App. 1987).
2 Coon also claimed negligence and violation of his civil rights under Cali-
fornia law. Id
255 Id
2- Id. at 876-78.257Id at 874.
218 Id at 876.
... The equivocation arises from a debate over whether the relation of mother-
foster child in one of the cases, Mobaldi v. Bd. of Regents, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720 (Ct.
App. 1976), counts as parent-child. The Coon court thought it did, Coon, 237 Cal.
Rptr. at 876 n.1, and therefore did not count the case as an exception. As discussed
in the text, the more interesting question is why the court would so regard that
relationship, elevating it above the committed relationship of(in particular) a same-
sex couple; The other two cases involved, respectively, the relation of uncle to
nephew, Kriventsov v. San Rafael Taxicabs, Inc., 229 Cal. Rptr. 768 (Ct. App.
1986), and an unmarried, opposite-sex couple. Ledger v. Tippitt, 210 Cal. Rptr. 814
(Ct. App. 1985).
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"exceptions," and either ignored,26 explained away,26 or disapproved.262
As we have seen, such treatment infects many decisions in this area. Courts
prefer "the establishment of a clear and definite standard limiting
liability.,,' 0
Several statements made by the court, however, suggest that the true
discomfort-or at least the greater extent of it-was with a same-sex
couple, not with the broader category of unmarried couples. First, the court
referred to Coon's life partner as his "male friend," and, as noted above, did
not deign to provide his full name. This "de-sexing" of the couple was
further evidenced by the court's citation to a statement in Prosser and
Keeton's Torts hornbook that was of little application in this case:
It would be an entirely unreasonable burden on all human activity if the
defendant... were to be compelled to pay for the lacerated feelings of
every other person disturbed by reason of it, including every bystander
shocked at an accident, and every distant relative of the person injurea
as well as all his friends.2"
Whatever the exact nature of the relationship between Coon and Ervin, it
bore no resemblance to any of the remote parties to whom Prosser rightly
feared extending recovery. But the court's reliance on this passage is of a
piece with its overall treatment of the couple, and its willingness to elevate
the often transient parent-foster child relationship over that ofa committed
= Coon, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 876 (citing but not discussing Kriventsov, 229 Cal.
Rptr. at 768). Kriventsov involved an uncle and a nephew. Since they were
"relatives" living in the same household, they would today be able to recover in
California, as stated by the California Supreme Court in Thing v. La Chusa, 771
P.2d 814, 828 (Cal. 1989). Despite the greater intimacy-including sexual
intimacy-that same-sex couples enjoy, they are (presumably) frozen out under
Thing, as they are not "related." Given the California court's generally conservative
leanings today, see infra Part H.A, I am not at all optimistic that the court would
regard an intimate same-sex couple as related. The passage of Proposition 22, see
supra note 21 and accompanying text, can only make matters even more difficult.
26, See discussion of Mobaldi v. Bd ofRegents, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720, supra note
259.
262 Ledger, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 814, discussed in Coon, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 877-78.
It is fair to say that the court both disapproved the result in Ledger and attempted
to explain why the claim before it was weaker still.
263 Coon, 237 Cal Rptr. at 877.




couple: "We view the relationship of mother and foster child... as a parent-
child relationship."2 5
The court's negation of the intimate life of the couple is obvious
enough from its holding and from the analysis above, but it gets worse. The
court distinguished the couple before it from the opposite-sex couple in
Ledger v. Tippitt,2" where a California appellate court had permitted an
emotional distress claim by an unmarried cohabitant to go forward. Rather
than simply disapproving the holding ih that case, the Coon court empha-
sized those facts from Ledger that it found sympathetic, most significantly
including the couple's having "establish[ed] a home with their natural
child."267 It then stated that, unlike the Ledger case, this case did not
involve a "de facto" marriage, "[n]or could such an allegation be made
because appellant and Ervin are both males and the Legislature has made
a determination that a legal marriage is between a man and a woman." z
This language is quite discouraging to any same-sex couple seeking
recovery for a loss to their relationship. First, the court does not see that,
once it allows any "de facto" marriage, it cannot then use the legislative
definition of marriage, without more, to exclude same-sex couples. More
disturbingly, the court is blind to the unfairness of denying marriage rights
to same-sex couples, and then using that denial to erase gay men and
lesbians from other areas of legal protection. Finally, the decision's
depressing refusal to recognize the couple at all goes hand-in-hand with its
inability to see that same-sex couples, deprived of the option to marry, are
more sympathetic candidates for relaxing the bright-line, marriage-only
rule.269
265 Coon, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 876 n.1.
266 Ledger, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
267 Id at 828 (quoted in Coon, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 877).
268 Coon, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 877-78.
269 Coon did inspire what was mislabeled a "dissent." Presiding Judge White
actually concurred in the judgment, as he did not believe that the incident was of
a type sufficiently serious to warrant recovery to the secondary victim. He
dissented, though, from the central holding that the tort's protections should not be
available to unmarried intimates, and in fact emphasized the unfairness of
disallowing same-sex couples from bringing the claim: "Since homosexuals cannot
many ... ,under the majority's decision, they are precluded from ever recovering
for negligent infliction of emotional distress." Id at 882-83 (White, P.J.,
dissenting). After noting that, in "contemporary society ... it is foreseeable a
homosexual relationship might exist," id at 883, Judge White opted for a more
functional definition of family: "'[Flamily' may 'mean different things under
different circumstances. The faunily ... may be... a particular group of people
[VOL. 89
SAME-SEX COUPLES AND TORT LAW
2. Wrongful Death
One would expect less likelihood of success on a wrongful death claim
brought by the surviving intimate of a same-sex couple, because, as noted
earlier, these statutory creations clearly define their beneficiaries, and
unmarried cohabitants are not among them."' It is therefore unexpected
that the two decided cases27' yield little clarity on the point one allows
such a claim, and the one that does not inspires a strong dissent. Of course,
more telling is the lack of case law, which strongly suggests that potential
litigants recognize that such claims are likely to be unsuccessful. Nonethe-
less, the slight sympathy that one finds for survivors of same-sex relation-
ships in these cases is fully consistent with one of the central tenets of this
Article: Courts are more comfortable when they are able to look away from
the couple's intimate life. Wrongful death claims permit doing so, at least
to some extent. Although the tort has, in some jurisdictions, grown to
accommodate the loss of consortium, the primary recovery is often for the
loss of economic support that the decedent had provided to the survivor.
Indeed, the two opinions arguing for recovery emphasize this purpose of
related by blood or marriage, or not related at all, who are living together in the
intimate and mutual interdependence of a single home or household...."' Id
(quoting MacGregor v. Unemployment Ins. App. Bd., 689 P.2d Rptr. 453, 458
(Cal. 1984)).
270 But see HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-3(b) (Supp. 1999) (which lists "reciprocal
beneficiary" among the potential beneficiaries); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §
1204(e)(2) (Supp. 2000) (wrongful death listed as tort claim available to parties to
a civil union). The 1997 Hawaii Amendment is specifically meant to provide a
claim to same-sex partners (among others) who meet certain requirements, set forth
at HAW. REv. STAT. § 572C (Supp. 1999). This matter is discussed more fully in
infra notes 292-300 and accompanying text.
21 Depending on one's definition of a same-sex couple, it is possible to add a
third case to this short list-but I would not. In Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223
(Tex. App. 1999), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 174 (2000), the court held that a couple
that had been legally married for many years had not, in fact, been parties to a valid
marriage, because both parties were born as biological men. One of the "men,"
however, had undergone sexual reassignment surgery before marriage, and lived
as a woman. Despite this fact, the court held that sexual identity was biologically
determined. Since this meant that the two men had (illegally) married, there could
be no wrongful death claim. In the court's view: "[S]ome things we cannot will into
being. They just are." Id at 231. The decision in this case strikes me as both
willfully false and exceptionally cruel, because of the extent to which the court
went in denying the reality of the couple's life, thereby depriving the survivor of
financial support-and only to protect an allegedly negligent defendant.
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the tort. Doing so enables avoidance of the "details" of the relationship. To
be fair, though, these opinions display at least less embarrassment about the
intimate life of the couple than is typically the case.
The winning case is Solomon v. District of Columbiatm where the trial
judge denied the District of Columbia's motion for summary judgment in
a wrongful death case brought by a woman whose lesbian partner had
allegedly been killed through the District's negligence. The District's
motion was based on a straightforward reading of the statute, which limited
recovery to "spouse" and "next of kin."' The court, though, exploited the
lack of an explicit statutory definition of "next of kin" to find that the
survivor qualified as such, even though she could not be considered a
spouse. While the result was not strictly contradicted by a disqualifying
definition of "next of kin," the court's result required disregarding the
overall structure of the law of intestacy. That law provides a comprehen-
sive, and, it appears, complete list of those who qualify as next of kin; not
surprisingly, surviving members of intimate, but unmarried, couples are not
included in that catalogue.27 4
Nonetheless, the court's acknowledgment of the couple's life together
is heartening:
The relationship between Ms. Solomon and Ms. Lane [the decedent]
contained all the attributes of a married couple but for the fact that it is a
same sex union that cannot be recognized with a marriage license....
[T]his close relationship, coupled with the fact that they were both legally
recognized parents of the same two children leads the Court to conclude
that Ms. Solomon is the next of kin of Ms. Lane.275
This language is direct and unembarrassed, recognizing the interconnected-
ness of a life of committed relation. Such a relation includes intimacy of
many kinds, and certainly the presence of two children is an important part
of this intimate relationship. Judge Dorsey seems to have understood the
artificiality ofseparatingthe parenting role from the spousal one, especially
Solomon v. Dist. of Columbia, 21 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1305, 1316 (D.C.
Super. Ct., No. 94-2709, Apr. 26, 1995).
27 Id The decision is reported only in the BNA Family Law Reporter, and
represents the reporter's synopsis of the case, not the exact language used by the
judge. Quoted material is taken from 1995 Lesbian/Gay L. Notes 83.
274 See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 19-301 - 316 (1999); see also Lewis v. Lewis, 708
A.2d 249, 251-52 (D.C. 1998).
2 Solomon v. Dist. of Columbia, 1995 Lesbian/Gay L. Notes 83.
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since failure to recognize the couple as such would have created an
anomalous result: "It is clear that the two children are eligible to receive
remedy pursuant to the Wrongful Death Act .... Since Ms. Solomon also
relied on her for support and maintenance, logic dictates that she is also
entitled to remedies.... 276 Whether the court would have been as
sympathetic had the couple not had children is open to debate, but the tenor
of the discussion suggests a broader empathy than is typical. On the other
hand, the couple is obviously no longer in an intimate relationship, so the
court could focus on the children and the loss of the economic support the
decedent had provided the family, rather than on the couple itself. In any
case, Solomon confronts the inconsistency, avoided by other courts,
between recognizing the children of same-sex relationships while denying
the relationships themselves.2'
The other burst of sympathy for a surviving dependent in a same-sex
wrongful death case is Judge Rosenberger's dissenting opinion in Raum v.
Restaurant Associates, Inc.27 The opinion is particularly noteworthy, as
Judge Rosenberger had to overcome not only the language of the statute,
but a host of mostly unfavorable precedent, as well. New York's wrongful
death statute limits recovery to spouses and blood relatives," 9 and further
states that "[a] husband or wife is a surviving spouse...." 2 While the
majority regarded this language as conclusive on the matter,28" ' Judge
Rosenberger noted that the language in question had the purpose of
presuming that a husband or wife was a "spouse" absent divorce, separa-
tion, or abandonment, not of restricting the term to "husband or wife" in
every case.2'
Once having read the statute as ambiguous, Judge Rosenberger invoked
Braschi,"3 following that decision's invitation to choose a "functional over
276 Id
27 See supra Part I.C.
278 Raum v. Restaurant Ass'n, 675 N.Y.S.2d 343, 345 (App. Div. 1998)
(Rosenberger, J.P., dissenting).279 NY Est. Powers & Trusts Law §§ 1-2.5,4-1.1, 5-1.2 (McKinney 1998). The
dissent provides an explanation of the statutory mechanism by which the qualifying
parties are established. Raum, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 345 (Rosenberger, J.P., dissenting).
As is typical, those entitled to a distribution under the wrongful death statute are
those "who would be entitled to a share of the decedent's property if he died
intestate." Id
2 ° NY Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 5-1.2.
281 Raum, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 345.
21 Id at 345 (Rosenberger, J.P., dissenting).
'3 See discussion at supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
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a literal interpretation of a statute whose purpose is to promote the public
welfare, so that homosexual couples will not be disadvantaged by their
inability to give their relationship a legal status." He also noted that, in
contrast to other cases in which the court had declined to call same-sex
partners "spouses,"285 "the wrongful-death statute makes no alternative
provision for homosexual dependents, which.., raises equal protection
problems unless surviving 'spouse' is interpreted more broadly.
286
Given the purposes of the wrongful death statute, which include
"compensat[ing] the victim's dependents,... punish[ing] and deter[ing]
tortfeasors and... reduc[ing] welfare dependency," Judge Rosenberger
saw "no rational basis for excluding a class of injured dependents from
recovery ...simply because the dependents did not have a legally-
recognized relationship with the decedent."287 Thus, even under the
permissive, "rational basis" equal protection standard,288 the statutory
exclusion could not be defended.
There is merit in this approach of attempting to avoid a constitutional
problem by reading the statute expansively. Further, allowing same-sex
marriage would accomplish, wholesale, what otherwise must be accom-
plished piecemeal. Indeed, this Article would be unnecessary if same-sex
2 Raum, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 345 (Rosenberger, J.P., dissenting).
" These cases include efforts by surviving same-sex partners to be considered
spouses under the law of intestate succession, Matter of Cooper, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797
(App. Div. 1993), as well as a case in which the Crime Victims Board decided that
same-sex partners werenot surviving spouses to be compensated underthe relevant
law. Secord v. Fischetti, 653 N.Y.S.2d 551 (App. Div. 1997). Although in the first
set of cases, same-sex and opposite-sex couples are not identically situated, at least
the same-sex partners can provide for each other by will, thereby avoiding the
intestacy problem. As to Secord, Judge Rosenberger noted that surviving same-sex
partners were able to recover under a different section of the statute, which paid
damages to "any other person dependent for his principal support upon a victim of
a crime." Raum, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 346 (Rosenberger, J.P., dissenting). The lack of
alternative protection provided by the wrongful death statute seems to have been
the linchpin of Judge Rosenberger's argument.
216 Raum, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 346 (Rosenberger, J.P., dissenting).
17 Id, at 347 (Rosenberger, J.P., dissenting).
' The particular appellate court on which Judge Rosenberger sat had already
taken the rare position that classifications based on sexual orientation should be
"'subjected to strict, or at least heightened, scrutiny."' Id at 346 (quoting Under
21 v. City of New York, 488 N.Y.S.2d 669, 675 (App. Div.), rev'd on other
grounds, 482 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 1985)). Reading the wrongful death statute to exclude
same-sex couples would violate even the rational basis standard, according to
Judge Rosenberger.
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marriage were recognized, because the reforms it demands would be
comprehended by that central victory. On the other hand, there is neither
reason nor luxury to wait for universal recognition of same-sex couples
before seeking other advances. For the reasons developed below, wrongful
death statutes constitute a particularly compelling case for reform, for both
same and opposite-sex couples.
Judge Rosenberger has sensed, although not clearly articulated, an
anomaly concerning these statutes, which should be addressed by legisla-
tures, or, where the statute will so permit, by courts. Creative attempts to
avoid the conclusion aside, these statutes restrict recovery either to a small
class of beneficiaries that are typically "first up" in the intestacy statutes,
or to specifically enumerated beneficiaries." 9 While it is probably still true
today that such beneficiaries are the likeliest to be economically bereft by
the primary victim's death, what reasonable basis is there for statutorily
(and therefore irrebuttably) presuming that to be the case? The answer
cannot be administrative convenience, because damages must be proven by
anyone who seeks to recover, and most of the damages awarded in a
particular case are likely to be for the loss of economic support-an
element of damage that is comparatively easy to prove. If administrative
issues predominated, one would expect the statutes to restrict recovery to
those damages, but, as noted above, those restrictions are increasingly
falling away. Even to the extent they remain, they should apply equally to
all potential plaintiffs. Further, one can avoid the effects of the intestacy
statute easily enough, but can do nothing to change the outcome in a
wrongful death suit. So, for example, a same-sex couple of many years
might provide, by will, that the entire estate of the first deceased will pass
to the second, but the survivor of that same couple would not be able to
recover a penny against the tortfeasor whose negligence resulted in the
death of her partner.2 As we have seen above, this result cannot be
289 See supra notes 209-13 and accompanying text.
290It may sometimes be possible for surviving same-sex partners to recover if
they are the beneficiaries under the will, albeit for limited classes of damages. See
supra notes 214-15 and accompanying text. One possible avenue of more
substantial compensation might be punitive damages, if appropriate in the case and
under the relevant state's law, because these would become assets of the estate. In
Alabama, the sole purpose of the wrongful death law is to deter the tortfeasor by
punishing him or her. ALA. CODE § 6-5-410 (2000); see Cherokee Elec. Coop. v.
Cochran, 706 So. 2d 1188, 1193 n.5 (Ala. 1997) (Alabama Supreme Court has
construed the statute as permitting only punitive damages, a construction not
disturbed by the legislature); id at 1194 (citing Louis Pizitz Dry Goods v. Yeldell,
274 U.S. 112 (1927) (United States Supreme Court has upheld application of the
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justified by standard tort principles of foreseeability, because such
dependence is certainly foreseeable. Lacking any apparent administrative
justification, either, the statutes cannot be reasonably defended, as to either
same-sex or opposite-sex unmarried couples.?9
Hawaii and Vermont recently became the first two states to clearly
permit the surviving member of a same-sex couple to recover in wrongful
death?92 Particularly in Hawaii, this victory hides a painful defeat, because
this and other rights have been accorded gay and lesbian people as a
palliative in the wake of the state's rejection of same-sex marriage.' To
a successful plaintiff, though, having this right will be much better than not
having it. Here, I will discuss the mechanics of the Hawaii statute, and then
offer a few remarks as to what this important victory may come to mean.29
In 1997, Hawaii amended its wrongful death statute, adding to the
category of those entitled to recover damages an entity called the "recipro-
cal beneficiary."295 That term, in turn, is defined in Title 31, Chapter 572C,
of the Hawaii statutes. By agreement, two parties may enter into a
statute to cases involving merely negligent conduct)).
29 Interestingly, Michigan appears to be the one state in which recovery under
the wrongful death statute more closely tracks actual loss. The statute lists three
different classes of potential beneficiaries, the third of which is "persons who are
devisees under the will of the deceased, except those whose relationship with the
decedent violated Michigan law." MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2922(3)(c) (2000). A
same-sex partner who is a named beneficiary under a will might therefore recover
for actual loss suffered. The limiting language regarding illegal relationships
presumably would not be an impediment, because Michigan has abandoned its
sodomy law, and a same-sex couple could not get married. An interesting question
would arise if the couple went to Vermont to engage in a civil union, however.
m HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-3 (1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(e)(2)
(Supp. 2000).
' Other rights include: hospital visitation and the right to make health care
decisions for the patient, HAw. REV. STAT. § 323-2 (1999); employer-provided
health benefits, id. § 431:10A-601; the ability to create the same tenancies in
property as married couples, id. § 509-2; and rights of inheritance, id. § 560.
2941 will have little to add concerning the Vermont statute, as victory for
Vermont residents on the relational torts discussed in this Article is complete. VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(eX2) lists wrongful death, emotional distress, and loss
of consortium as suits available to couples in a civil union. The Vermont Supreme
Court's unwillingness to require the remedy of marriage sought by the plaintiffs is
discussed in supra Part I.D. I explore the point more fully in John G. Culhane, A
Tale of Two Concurrences: Same-Sex Marriage and Products Liability, 7 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 447 (2001).29s HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-3(bX5) (1999) & Note on 1997 Amendment.
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"reciprocal beneficiary relationship" that provides them with such
protections as are expressly set forth by law2" (such as the wrongful death
statute) if they are "(1) each... at least eighteen years old; (2) [not]
married nor a party to another reciprocal beneficiary relationship; [and]
(3)... legally prohibited from marrying one another. 7
So, same-sex couples (but not intimate opposite-sex couples, who have
the option of marrying) can sign up as reciprocal beneficiaries and gain at
least some of the same benefits as married couples. Inasmuch as Hawaii's
wrongful death statute allows recovery for loss of consortium, it might
appear that the legislature, although uncomfortable with using the word
"marriage" in the case of same-sex couples, is at least willing to acknowl-
edge their lives of committed intimacy. The statute represents at least some
progress, but that statement should be qualified, in at least two important
respects.
First, the Vermont experience-granting same-sex couples in a civil
union all of the benefits of marriage, but withholding the label'
-underscores that legislatures are intransigent when it comes to the word
"marriage." The word is heavily freighted and zealously guarded by the
heterosexual center of power. For many, whatever the contemporary
realities of their own married lives, the word itself calls up powerful, and
ancient images of ritual and, of course, of two sexes. These images serve
more than a descriptive purpose, as they can be used to reinforce, often
subtly, the perception that marriage shouldbe between aman and a woman.
The spluttering inability of many opponents of same-sex marriage to
2
% HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-6 (1999) ("[Ihe parties... shall be entitled to
those rights and obligations provided by the law to reciprocal beneficiaries. Unless
otherwise expressly provided by law, reciprocal beneficiaries shall not have the
same rights and obligations under the law that are conferred through
marriage. ... .
297 Id. § 572C-4. More general requirements under the statute are that (4)
"[c]onsent... has not been obtained by force, duress, or fraud;" and that (5)
"[e]ach of the parties sign a declaration of reciprocal beneficiary relationship." Id
293 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201(2) (parties to a civil union "may receive the
benefits and protections and be subject to the responsibilities of spouses"), §
1204(a) (civil union confers "all the same benefits, protections and responsibilities
under law, whether they derive from statute, administrative or court rule, policy,
common law or any other source of civil law, as are granted to spouses in a
marriage."), § 1201(4) (defining marriage as "legally recognized union ofone man
and one woman"), § 1202(2) (to be eligible to enter into a civil union, the parties




articulate coherent reasons for their opposition serves as powerful evidence
of the effectiveness of such prescriptive description.
Second, a closer look at the "eligibility list" for reciprocal beneficiary
status shows that the law has economic protection as its centerpiece. By its
terms, an adult parent and offspring pair, or a brother and sister, would
qualify as reciprocal beneficiaries, since they cannot otherwise marry.?9
While extending benefits to those in such relationships is commendable, the
point is that same-sex couples have not been elevated to "virtual spouse"
status. It should be noted that same-sex couples do not stand on the same
footing as married couples in negligent infliction of emotional distress or
loss of consortium cases, at least not yet. Such omission is fully consistent
with my premise that these torts require confronting sexual intimacy
squarely.
°0
This distinction between wrongful death and the other relational torts
is important. Although victory on the wrongful death issue is important, it
can be seen as more in line with other reforms that confer some subset of
the economic benefits of marriage on same-sex couples. As noted
throughout this Article, the project of securing the unembarrassed
recognition of the value of gay and lesbian lives will remain fundamentally
incomplete until committed lives of intimacy are valued, not vilified.
Judicial recognition of loss of consortium and negligent infliction of
emotional distress, which rest in vital part on just that intimacy, would
nourish that cause, as well as the lives of successful plaintiffs. Why, then,
is the common law silent on these important questions? The remarks that
follow sketch out some explanations, and are also intended to serve as an
invitation to those in the field to take action.
E. Explaining the Silence
The three relational torts are similar principally in requiring some kind
of close relationship for recovery. Beyond that core similarity, however, the
299 Vermont has also recognized the reciprocal beneficiary relationship, but
limits that status to "two persons who are blood-relatives or related by adoption."
15 V.S.A. § 1301 (2001). Expressly declared ineligible are those who are party to
"a civil union or a marriage." Id Thus, the reciprocal beneficiary relationships in
Vermont and Hawaii are entirely different creatures.
10 Before the Vermont legislature acted, one might have been tempted to argue
that negligent infliction of emotional distress and loss of consortium are common-
law torts, so we would not expect legislation dealing with the issue. Given
Vermont's willingness to recognize these claims, as well as the confusion the
Hawaii courts will encounter in deciding whether to extend recovery under these
torts to same-sex couples, legislative guidance would have been welcome.
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definitional and practical differences among the three require careful
separation in order to understand the obstacles to bringing suit faced by
each. The discussions that follow take as a given that the parties (through
their attorneys) are aware of the lack of favorable precedent discussed
throughout this Article, and then offer further explanations as to why the
claims are not being brought. Reiterating the earlier caveat, the exercise
that follows is necessarily speculative.
1. Loss of Consortium
It is easy to see why the same-sex intimates of injured parties do not
bring suit for loss of consortium when their partners are injured. First, the
second-class citizenship of gay people may cause them to opt out of such
a suit for a couple of related reasons. They may not be 'out' enough to feel
comfortable in disclosing their relationship to a lawyer. Perhaps equally
distressingly, they may have internalized societal opprobrium---undergirded
by the plain fact that they cannot marry--to the extent that they themselves
do not regard their relationship as equivalent to those of heterosexuals, and
therefore do not think they have a claim worth bringing to the lawyer's
attention.0°
For those couples willing to risk bringing the fact of their relationship,
and injury, to the attention of a personal injury lawyer, the next point at
which same-sex couples might "lose" their loss of consortium claim would
be at that lawyer's doing."° If he or she has taken in broad societal
assumptions about the lesser value of gay and lesbian relationships, the
thought that a loss of consortium claim might be available in such a case
might never even arise. Anecdotal support for this point came from a
discussion with a student who had worked for a personal injury lawyer
during the Summer of 1999. In going through a list of standard questions
of injured parties, the lawyer would ask: "Are you married?" If so, the
possibility of raising a loss of consortium claim would be pursued. If not,
301 Deprived of the right to marry, and the concomitant lack of social support
for their unions, same-sex couples are met with constant reminders of "society's
view of [such relationships] as transitory, illicit, and not to be taken seriously."
BErrY BERZON, PERMANENT PARTNERS: BUILDING GAY AND LESBIAN
RELATIONSHIPS THAT LAST 11 (1988).
3o2See Marc Galanter, Makers of TortLaw, 49 DEPAuL L. REv. 559 (1999), for
a clear-eyed assessment of the role of lawyers in shaping torts claims. As he notes,
"tort law is not just tort doctrine, but is enmeshed with procedure, evidence,
institutional practice, the organization of law practices, the strategies of lawyers,
the proclivity to claim, and much more." Id at 559.
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no further inquiries were made. Assuming the idea does occur to the
attorney, the financial incentives imposed by the contingency fee arrange-
ment would seem to counsel against encouraging, or even mentioning, such
a claim. While failure to mention a viable claim would raise a serious
ethical issue, 3 counseling the couple not to pursue the claim raises no such
problem. The attorney could say, candidly, that the injury to the primary
victim is the "big ticket" item in the litigation, and that the couple might be
placing that at risk by seeking loss of consortium,'" given possible jury
prejudice towards gay people. This prejudice is well documented, so
perhaps it is unfair to criticize the lawyer for bringing it to the couple's
attention. Such a risk hardly seems worth bearing, especially inasmuch as
303 Under Rule 1.4 (b) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, as amended
in 1995, "[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation." The
lawyer could argue that, given the lack of case law supporting the claim, he or she
was under no duty to bring it to the client's attention. This argument might or might
not succeed, depending on whether the claim is deemed to be so far-fetched that
mentioning it would exceed a lawyer's duty. In a jurisdiction such as Hawaii or
New Jersey that has expressed willingness to regard opposite-sex unmarried
couples sympathetically, the lawyer would be well advisedto discuss the possibility
of a loss of consortium claim with a same-sex couple. Even in less sympathetic
states, the lawyer's better course ofaction would be to discuss the claim, ifonly in
the course of advising against it. Cf ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l.
Responsibility, Informal Op. 1523 (1987), cited in ANN. MODEL RULES PROF'L.
CONDUCT R. 1.4 cmt. at 38 (3d ed. 1996) (counseling that the "concept of
consultation" encompasses advising the client on the "advisability of the action
contemplated"--not just on his or her "legal rights and responsibilities.").
' This point assumes that the couple considers itselt at least to some extent,
as one financial unit. This assumption will often be correct in cases where the
couple is sufficiently intimate to consider a loss of consortium suit. When the
couple is not as financially connected, and the loss of consortium plaintiffsees her
interest as worthy ofprotection even though it might adversely affect her partner's
suit, the strain on the relationship might make the loss of consortium moot! For one
suggestion on how to avoid this paradox, see infranotes 380-82 and accompanying
text.
30 See Beliefs Guide Most Jurors, Poll Suggests, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Oct. 24,
1998, at A18 (noting that, in a poll conducted for the National Law Journal and a
trial consulting company, three out of four jurors were willing to do what they
believed was right, even if that were to contradict the judge's instructions on the
law, and "were more likely to feel they could not be fair or impartial toward a gay
or lesbian defendant than toward a defendant from other minority groups"). See
also supra note 148 (providing a discussion of litigation strategy excluding
mention of lesbian relationship).
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the prospects for judicial recognition of the claim may be dismal in most
jurisdictions.
It is also possible, if not likely, that mediators and judges are encourag-
ing parties to settle such loss of consortium claims before trial, thereby
focusing attention on the less controversial-and more economically
valuable--claim and keeping the issue of the parties' sexuality away from
the jury. In the alternative, some judges may have dismissed such loss of
consortium claims without reported decision. A sober look at precedent
(mostly involving opposite.sex couples, as we have seen) might then have
convinced the lawyer and the parties not to undertake the expense of
appeal.
Finally, there may be a few cases in which the loss of consortium claim
did reach a jury, but was denied by that body for any number of reasons
unknown: the jury prejudice mentioned above, the jurors' own view that
marriage should be strictly required for a loss of consortium claim, or the
simple conclusion that there had not, in fact, been such a loss. In principle,
it is also possible that some claims were successful at trial, but this seems
unlikely for two reasons. First, one would have expected some advocacy
group, if not the general media or a legal looseleafservice, to have reported
such a positive result.3 Second, given the strong argument from precedent
against such recovery, an appeal would have been expected.
•2. Negligent Infliction ofEmotional Distress
The problems with emotional distress suits are quite similar to those
explored in the consortium cases, but a few potential differences are worth
noting briefly. Although negligent infliction of emotional distress is a
relational injury in that it requires a close relationship, recovery is not for
loss to that relationship per se, but principally to protect the bystander's
own emotional well-being. Accordingly, it may be easier for potential
plaintiffs and their lawyers to conceptualize the injury differently from the
loss of consortium, by separating the plaintiff's own emotional distress
from the physical injury negligently inflicted on the partner. Although this
separation is something of an artifice, in that the plaintiff would likely
suffer no serious emotional distress absent the relationship, it perhaps
explains why courts have shown at least some willingness to allow
unmarried cohabitants,0 7 as well those not members ofthe primary victim's
3 Recall that Solomon v. Dist. of Columbia, 21 Farn. L. Rep. (BNA) 1305,




immediate family,"' to recover in these cases. Perhaps juries, too, would
be more sympathetic to such claims, as focus could be shifted to the
emotional distress caused by injury to "someone close" (generically put).
Such an emphasis might yield greater jury sympathy than the loss of an
intimate relationship that is not valued.
These differences aside, the explanations for the excision of possible
claims presented in the loss of consortium cases seem equally apt here: the
"self-editing" of the same-sex couple; the lawyer's blindness or fear of
jeopardizing the more lucrative claim; and the general reluctance of court
and jury to honor committed relationships between members of the same
sex.
3. Wrongful Death
The considerations underlying whether to bring awrongful death claim
are rather different from those discussed above. First, as discussed earlier,
the principal element of recovery in wrongful death cases is often the
economic loss that the bereft partner suffers from the sudden withdrawal
of support. Although there is emotional loss, too, such loss does not usually
assume the priority of place evident in loss of consortium and negligent
infliction of emotional distress cases, if indeed it is recoverable at all.3
Second, there is often no independent claim that may be lost or compro-
mised by bringing the wrongful death claim. If the primary victim dies
immediately, or almost immediately, he or she will pass a small claim, if
any, to the estate.10 Hence, the wrongful death claim might be the "big
ticket," or the only ticket. Third, wrongful death claims are statutory, not
judicially, derived.
The first two differences outlined above suggest that wrongful death
claims might at least be more likely brought than a loss of consortium or
negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. For example, while it is
still possible that the survivor might not be sufficiently "out" to disclose her
sexual orientation to a lawyer, economic exigency might compel a
308 See Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 830 n.10 (Cal. 1989) ("[a]bsent
exceptional circumstances, recovery should be limited to relatives residing in the
same household, or parents, siblings, children, and grandparents of the victim.").
3 See supra Part II.D.2.
So called survival statutes "breathe new life" into claims that once expired
when the primary victim did. Such claims now become an asset of the estate, which
receives any recovery from the decedent's lawsuit. KUTNER & REYNOLDS, supra
note 167, at 60-61 (discussing rule against recovery, the history of survival statutes,
and some of the questions that continue to arise).
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reassessment of that position, as well as of the related, self-abnegating view
that the relationship was not deserving of protection. Faced with a choice
of real financial hardship or remaining silent, a greater number of potential
plaintiffs might be expected to come forward.
Similarly, the case is likely to appear more attractive to a personal
injury lawyer, because bringing it does not place another claim at risk, nor
does it (necessarily) require exploration of the couple's intimate life3
Although the virtual lack of favorable precedent militates against bringing
the claim, doing so in a sympathetic jurisdiction might be advisable
-except that the third difference noted above creates a disincentive to do
so. Inasmuch as the language of wrongful death statutes typically lists an
exclusive class of beneficiaries, the absence of unmarried intimates from
that list is a daunting impediment to bringing suit.
As to the issue of what a jury might do with the claim, my prediction,
consistent with one of the dominant themes of this Article, is that more
sympathy might be expected than would be the case in a loss of consortium
or emotional distress suit. Jurors might not be comfortable with a same-sex
relationship, but that relationship has now ended. Focus now moves away
from intimacy to loss, a concept with which many jurors will be familiar.
Also, the move from the "fuzzy" relational intimacy--especially that of a
same-sex couple--to the hard facts of economic hardship will likely
engender sympathy, as well.
In short, if wrongful death were not a statutory tort, one might well
expect a fair degree of success by surviving members of same-sex couples.
The rigidity of definition imposed by such statutes, however, makes success
unlikely. This result is particularly maddening, because wrongful death has
been statutorily constituted only because of historical accident" A
creative court can read around the statute, or give birth to a common law
right to sue for wrongful death, but these are likely to be limited initiatives.
As the positive developments in Vermont and Hawaii suggest, statutory
reform is the more promising route.
II. TORT LAW CAN MOVE SAME-SEX
COUPLES TOWARD VALIDATION
The first two Parts of this Article are admittedly somewhat disspiriting,
in emphasizing the judiciary's general aversion to the intimate lives of
... As suggested earlier, this observationholds little weightwhen the decedent's
own claim is valuable, as where he or she survived for a period after injury, at great
pain and expense.312 See supra Part II.C.
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same-sex couples, as well as its fondness for bright-line rules that value
legal status over real relationships and loss. Indeed, these obstacles make
the project of securing the full rights of citizenship for gay people more
difficult than is generally acknowledged. In this Part, though, I infuse a
measure of optimism. This enthusiasm is the product of two seemingly
paradoxical points. First, tort law has historically had a transformative
power that exceeds its central concern with achieving a just outcome in
the case before it. Such power is not surprising, upon reflection, because
tort concerns itself with the most fundamental questions of the rela-
tions between people. As relations change, or are thought about differently,
tort can respond only if its foundational principles admit of flexible
application. Because of the creative power inherent in tort's elastic
capacity, recognizing a right of recovery for relational injury by same-sex
couples could begin to change the wider terrain, legal and societal, for gay
people.
The second, and paradoxical, point, is that the prospect of judicial
recognition of same-sex relational injuries is not by itself, as frightening
as, say, same-sex marriage. As noted earlier, extending "marriage" to same-
sex couples has enormous social, definitional, and practical implications:
allowing recovery for the loss of relational interest by itself, does not.
Recent developments in California illustrate this point. On the one
hand, the voters of California recently and overwhelmingly approved
Proposition 22, which restricts marriage to the union of a man and a
woman." 3 On the other hand, Assembly Bill 25, given fresh impetus by
Sharon Smith's inability to sue for her partner's wrongful death, would
change California law to grant standing to surviving members of domestic
partnerships" 4 in both wrongful death and negligent infliction of emotional
distress cases. Thus, many of the state's legislators, certainly attuned to the
clear message from the electorate on the subject of same-sex marriage, have
thus far taken a much different view of this new exhortation to create
313 See supra note 5.
314 California law has laid the groundwork for such legislation, because same-
sex couples are already permitted to register as domestic partners. In 1999, Gov.
Gray Davis signed a flimsy bill that established a domestic partner registry and
granted such those in such partnerships a few rights, including hospital visitation
and health benefits for state workers. Greg Lucas, Domestic PartnerBenefits OK'd
by Panel, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 14, 2001, at A3. The proposal currently under
consideration would expand the small group of benefits conferred by such status
to include standing to sue for wrongful death and negligent infliction of emotional
harm, as well as a small but significant group of additional rights. The bill, A.B. 25,
can be tracked at www.assembly.ca.gov.
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equality for same-sex couples in tort suits 5 Although conservative voices
have predictably called the bill "an end run around marriage,"3 6 it has
cleared the Assembly Judiciary Committee, and is thought to stand a
reasonable chance of passage.3 The legislators are not being particularly
courageous, either: a majority of Californians, even though they opposed
same-sex marriage, support granting same-sex couples legal rights short of
that jealously guarded status"
This final section is primarily devoted to the first point above. I explore
the power of tort to take the lead in changing the way society thinks and
acts about certain issues? 9 This discussion takes in both historical and
contemporary examples, focusing on both the rhetorical and practical
effects of a selection of decisions, some of which turned out to be epochal.
Such transformations, however, are the exception rather than the norm.
Those litigating on behalf of same-sex couples should not be falsely
optimistic about their chances of unleashing the creative force ofjudicial
change. I discuss the current legal climate in a few states, partly for strategy
suggestions as to litigating (or not doing so) in those states, but more to
provide competing decisional paradigms that advocates might look to in
planning what to do in other jurisdictions.
A. (Dis)Respecting Tort Principles
Although retrenchment is today in evidence in many states,320 tort law
has come a long and healthy way since the days of formal, ritualized
"' Consistent with one of the central themes of this Article, it is interesting to
note that the bill makes no mention of loss of consortium cases, in which the
intimate life of the couple is most plainly in view.
316 Lucas, supranote314 (quoting Randy Thomasson, executive director ofthe
Campaign for California Families).
317 Id.
3 " Hallye Jordan, Partner ofDogAttack Victim Pushesfor Bill that Would Allow
Her to Sue, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Mar. 14, 2001 (stating that between 59% and
67% of Californians support granting legal rights to gay and lesbian couples).
"' There is danger of naivete here. Judges tarred as overly progressive can find
themselves "replaced," or "overruled" by statute. My sense is that extending
recovery to same-sex couples for relational losses is not the type of advance that
would trigger outrage sufficient to upend the decision, cause a recall of the judges
(where permitted by law), orjeopardize other gains, but advocates will have a more
state-specific sense of likely outcomes.
32 SeeEllen S. Pryor, Mapping the Receding Boundaries of Tort Law, 1 (1998)
(unpublishedmanuscript, on file with author): "[T]ort lawhas become significantly
more conservative in the past fifteen years." Of particular interest for present
purposes, Professor Pryor discusses the tendency of courts to employ bright-line,
"no duty" rules to keep cases from reaching the jury. Id at 21-23.
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pleading, and strict, unbending rules. The evolution towards flexible
standards has been occasioned and necessitated by changes in both the
surrounding culture and the recognition that such rules no longer serve the
interests ofjustice, if they ever did. A few well-known cases have had the
advantage of timing and the power of rhetoric in driving home the need for
change. As one particularly compelling example, consider Justice
Cardozo's memorable opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,321
abrogating the by-then unworkable rule that product-injured plaintiffs could
bring a negligence suit only against the direct seller, even though the
negligent actor would likely have been the manufacturer. Conditions of
marketing and sales had changed sufficiently by the year of decision, 1916,
that the plaintiffwas left with a remedy against the wrong person. Whereas
consumers once purchased goods from their maker, mass-marketing had
come to create a broad retail stratum between maker and buyer. Thus, the
so-called privity rule had outlived whatever usefulness it ever had, and
Cardozo unleashed the rhetorical power of tort in eliminating the rule: "We
have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the
consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of contract and
nothing else. We have put the source of the obligation where it ought to be.
We have put its source in the law."3' Powered by the force of its real-world
logic and its lofty rhetoric, MacPherson ushered in a wholesale change in
the law of liability for defective products.
23
More recently, in a bold series of decisions beginning in the 1960s and
ending in the 1980s, the California Supreme Court unleashed the power of
tort law to assist those who, in "our current crowded [and interdependent]
society,"'324 had been placed at risk through the carelessness of others.
Repeatedly invoking the concept of foreseeability of injury caused by
unreasonable risk, the court did away with the strict, medieval categories
of entrants onto land, opting instead for a rule of reasonable care under the
circumstances;3" imposed a duty on therapists to warn those identified as
potential victims of violence;3 26 did away with the all-or-nothing rule'of
contributory negligence;327 carried MacPherson to the next stage by
321 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., Ill N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
322 Id at 1053.
323 DOBBS, supra note 146, at 973 ("[o]ver the years, other courts came to
accept MacPherson").
324 Tarasoffv. Bd. of Regents, 551 P.2d 334, 337 (Cal. 1976).3
' Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
326 Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 334.
327 Liv. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975). It should be noted that,
in this case at least, the California Supreme Court was not breaking new ground.
As the court stated, by 1975 "25 states, [had] abrogated the 'all-or-nothing' rule of
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imposing strict liability on those who manufacture defective products;328
and, as we have already seen, abrogated the artificial "zone of danger"
requirement in emotional distress cases involving bystanders.329
These cases stressed the foreseeability of injury given defendant's
negligence, the creation of incentives to exercise reasonable care, and the
relative helplessness of plaintiffs to protect themselves. Such consider-
ations were particularly powerful in cases such as Tarasoff v. Board of
Regents330 and Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,3 ' involving,
respectively, an unsuspecting victim ofatherapist's patient and a consumer
injured by a latent product defect. These cases are noteworthy both for the
results they achieve and for their consistent recognition that the default rule
for negligently caused personal injuries is liability, at least where harm to
plaintiff is foreseeable.332 In Rowland v. Christian,333 for example, the
following language appears: "Although... some exceptions have been
contributory negligence." However, only one state (Florida) had accomplished the
change via judicial decision; the other changes were wrought by legislation. Id at
1232. Thus, Li is progressive in its determination that justice to injured plaintiffs
need not await statutory change. Courts, the very bodies that created the doctrine,
are free to eliminate it.
31 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). This
groundbreaking case, augured by Justice Traynor's prescient concurrence in Escola
v. Coca-Cola BottlingCo., 150 P.2d436, 444 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring)
placed strict liability in tort, thereby avoiding the complications that had resulted
through efforts to squeeze product defect claims into warranty law.
329 Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968), overruling Amaya v. Home Ice.,
Fuel & Supply Co., 379 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1963). These and other advanced by the
California Supreme Court, as well as the court's subsequent retreat to bright-line
rules, are chronicled in Stephen D. Sugarman, Judges As Tort Law Unmakers:
Recent California Experience with 'New' Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 455 (1999).
330 Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 334.
331 Greenman, 377 P.2d at 897.
332 See Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
407, 440 (1987). The defendant who acts without exercising reasonable care
"releases a set of possibilities that due care could have avoided." Weinrib, a strict
formalist, believes that liability should follow when anything in that "set of
possibilities" results in injury to a given person. In my view, liability for
foreseeable injuries should not be derived formally (and therefore as a matter of
course), because of the competing practical considerations relevant to deciding
cases. Nonetheless, Weinrib's powerful appeal to corrective justice between the
parties suggests that liability be imposed for foreseeable risk unless there is a
compelling reason to decide otherwise.
... Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968) (abrogating strict categories
of entrants onto land).
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made to the general principle that a person is liable for injuries caused by
... failure to exercise reasonable care... , no such exception should be
made unless clearly supported by public policy.""' In short, the run of
California decisions during this period indicates a commendable awareness
of both changing conditions and a move away from formalistic modes of
thinking?
35
"I Id. at 564; see also Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 342. This is not to say that the
California court did not render questionable decisions during this era. For example,
in JAire v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60 (Cal. 1979), the principle of foreseeability was
employed to render tortious the negligence of a contractor in failing to act
reasonably in performing its service contract. Inasmuch as the plaintiff's contract
was with the City (which in turn had a contract with the contractor), the plaintiff's
only recourse against the contractor was in tort. Permitting the claim may have been
defensible under the facts that the court emphasized, which seem to have included
a high degree of negligence in the face of knowledge of the plaintiff's predicament,
but the case set an unwise precedent. In JAire, the plaintiff could have structured
its contractual remedies differently, ormighthave insisted the contract between the
town and the contractor make clear that the benefits were to run to the plaintiff,
thereby creating a claim under third-party beneficiary principles of contract. This
case does not present the more difficult situation of economic loss suffered by a
helpless plaintiff, where, for example, the negligent discharge of oil or chemicals
into water causes business losses in the surrounding area. See, e.g., Union Oil Co.
v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974) (oil company has duty not to negligently
harm sea life and could be liable for profits lost as result of discharge); Pruitt v.
Allied Chem. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Va. 1981) (making a fine distinction
between marina owners and owners of boat and fish supply shops, who could
recover, and businesses deprived of seafood supplies, who could not).
33S The waning of rigid proscriptive rules undergirded by binary ways of
thinking is particularly evident in the movement, beginning in the 1960s and then
gathering hurricane force, away from the strict rule that plaintiff's contributory
negligence should completely bar recovery. The principal reason forthe formerrule
appears to have been that, in cases of contributory negligence, the plaintiff was
thought to have wholly caused his own injury. See Butterfield v. Forrester, 103
Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809), reprinted in RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS 308-09 (7th ed. 2000) (where plaintiffnegligently rode his
speeding horse over a pole that defendant had negligently left lying across a road,
recovery denied: "If [plaintiff] had used ordinary care he must have seen the
obstruction so that the accident appeared to happen entirely from his own fault").
That causal notions supported the rule is evidenced by the now-archival rule of last
clear chance, which salvaged the complaint when defendant's last opportunity to
avoid the injuryfollowedplaintiff's negligence. As further illustration of the power
of legal formalism at that time, consider the complex rules under the last clear
chance doctrine about the defendant's different duties depending on whether the
plaintiff was helpless or "merely" inattentive. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
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Although the general principle at work in personal injury cases is
liability for foreseeable risk, an unbending rule to that effect would result
in unfair and excessive liability. Rather, courts must define a manageable
subset of cases for liability given a foreseeable risk. As the New Jersey
court straightforwardly recognized in Dunphy, the decision whether to
recognize a duty involves a "complex analysis."336 The considerations that
courts have found salient in attempting to fix the boundaries of liability
include the blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the closeness (or
remoteness) of damage from the wrongful act, the nature ofthe injury, and
the advisability vel non of deterring future harms of this sort.33
Nonetheless, some courts seem heedless of the California Supreme
Court's wise epigram that "legal duties are not discoverable facts of
nature," '338 and have shown little inclination to undertake the kind of
complex analysis that is often required. In fact, California itself has
recently been unwilling to follow the broad principles its own decisions
have laid down, and has instead been fortifying the bright-line ramparts.339
Perhaps the most dramatic example ofthis flinching is Thingv. LaChusa,3"4
discussed earlier,341 in which the California Supreme Court betrayed the
central holding of Dillon, by holding that the factors relevant to
foreseeability in the case of negligent infliction of emotional distress were
now to be taken as unbending requirements.'
Other California cases involving claims of emotional distress have
sometimes been met with a similarly unenlightened, and unprincipled,
refusal to extend liability even to plaintiffs who suffer emotionally from
negligently caused injury to immediate family members. In Huggins v.
TORTS §§ 479 -480 (1965).
336 Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A2d 372,376 (1994).
337 This list is my own, pieced together from cases such as Dunphy, id, and the
California cases discussed above.33
9 Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 342.
339 See Sugarman, supra note 329, at 471-87.
3
4
0 Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989).1 See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
342 Thing, 771 P.2d at 815. It is worth noting that the court cites favorably to an
article by John L. Diamond, Dillon v. LeggRevisited: Toward a Unified Theory of
Compensating Bystanders and Relativesfor Intangible Injuries, 35 HASTINGS L..
477, 487-89 (1984), for the proposition that the relationship of plaintiff to the
person suffering physical injury is directly relevant to foreseeability of emotional
distress-but then fails to apply that insight to the obvious point that the important




Longs Drug Stores Cal., Inc. , for example, the California Supreme Court
denied a parent's claim for emotional distress resulting from injury to their
child that was in turn caused by a pharmacist's negligently prescribing five
times the appropriate dosage, apparently because the parents and the drug
store stood in no special relationship" 4 Why is there not such a relation-
ship based on the obvious fact that the parents purchased the drug for the
child's benefit? That question is difficult to answer, especially since, just
two years before Huggins, the court-by the very same Judge, Baxter-let
stand a claim by the entire family, not just the contracting party, against a
crematorium for disrespectful treatment ofa corpse. 5 So the decisions are
inconsistent (and therefore unprincipled), and place the California Supreme
Court in the upside-down position of respecting feelings towards bodies
ahead of distress caused to a living intimate.
California's approach is enlightened, however, compared to the dismal
performance of the Texas Supreme Court.3" In a series of decisions that
can only be explained by enthrallment with the insurance industry, 47 the
court has resurrected arcane pleading rules, creating an ever-changing
labyrinth for plaintiffs;3 48 when that has not sufficed, the court has had no
343 Huggins v. Longs Drug Stores Cal., Inc., 862 P.2d 148 (Cal. 1993).
3" Id. at 152-53.
141 Christensen v. Superior Court, 820 P.2d 181 (Cal. 1991).
" For discussions of the recent movement of the Texas Supreme Court toward
unbending "no duty" rules, see Phil Hardberger, Juries Under Siege, 30 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 1 (1998); William Powers, Jr., Judge and Jury in the Texas Supreme
Court, 75 TEx. L. REv. 1699 (1997).3471 In a revealing telecast, 60 Minutes: Justice For Sale? (CBS television broad-
cast, Nov. 1, 1998), the reason for such insurance and business community
sympathy was convincingly traced to the process of fund-raising and electing
judges in Texas. Walt Borges, once a court reporter and now a consumer advocate,
stated that the court finds for the insurance companies "roughly 90 percent of the
time." Id Tr. at 3. According to an organization called Texans for Public Justice,
"the... ourt ... receives most of its contributions from corporations and doctors,
and their lawyers." Id at 4. According to the organization's director, "members of
[the] Supreme Court, in their quest to raise $9 million, raised $4 million of that
money from the very lawyers and parties who had cases before the court during that
period." Id It must be said that, before the past ten or so years, the court had been
influenced in the opposite direction. Id at 2.
"' A powerful example of the Texas Supreme Court's fascination with strict
pleading requirements is H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Warner, 845 S.W.2d 258 (Tex.
1992), a slip-and-fall case. There, the court undertook a wholly artificial separation
of "claims" of premises liability and negligence in an activity conducted on the
premises, a distinction not supported by tort law. The court then held that plaintiffs
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hesitation in simply holding thatthe defendant owed the plaintiffno duty.
349
Consider how the following two cases betray the foundational principles of
tort-unless those principles are taken to include subsidy of the insurance
industry.
Boyles v. Ker 5 is the case that, not surprisingly, has received the
greater notoriety. As the case involves emotional distress, it is an apt place
to begin. Plaintiff, age nineteen, and defendant age seventeen, were
involved in an intimate sexual relationship. Defendant Boyles and three
friends, also defendants, set up a video camera to record Boyles and
had not provided sufficient notice in their pleadings of their allegation that a "bag
your own chicken" promotion was itself negligent, despite the plain enough
allegation that defendant had "fail[ed] to provide the Plaintiff and the general
public with a safe place... to shop." Id at 258-59. The court also stated that
plaintiffwas injured by a condition on the premises, not by an activity. Id at 259.
Since the jury found that defendant neither knew nor should have known of the
particular mess of chicken blood on which the plaintiff slipped-the defective
condition-she (and her husband) had no claim. Id
Should plaintiffs' attorneys in future cases allege the tort of "negligent failure
to pre-bag chickens," as Justice Mauzy suggested in dissent? Id at 260 (Mauzy, J.,
dissenting). Only by doing so, it seems, might the plaintiff have avoided the
whipsaw the court created: "[The] complaint about the unbagged chickens is
rendered a nullity on the reasoning that [it does not fall] within a general claim of
premises liability, and too vaguely plead to permit consideration on a separate
basis." Id Even though plaintiff made clear enough that she was alleging that the
unbagged chickens promotion was a negligent decision, she had no remedy. As
Justice Mauzy pointed out, the majority's solicitude towardthe insurance injury led
to an exhumation of long-dead, formal pleading requirements:
Early common law required that a plaintiff search a register of writs for a
"form of action" that fit the particulars of the complaint; if there was none,
or if the plaintiff chose the wrong one, the king's court would provide no
remedy.... The majority opinion defies modem rules of pleading, which
require only that a plaintiff put the defendant on notice of the claim....
[The majority's] retrograde analysis runs counter not only to modem tenets
of procedure, but also to this court's plainly stated determination that 'an
invitee's suit.. . is a simple negligence action.'
Id at 260-61.
9 Texas appellate judge Phil Harberger has collected many of the "no duty"
cases, and noted that the Texas Supreme Court has used this blunt instrument in
combination with others---" 'no proximate cause,' 'no evidence,' 'insufficient
evidence,' 'unreliable experts,' 'unqualified experts,' and 'junk science' "--as well
as increased use of summary judgment to take cases fromjuries. Hardberger, supra
note 346, at 4.3 0 Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1993).
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plaintiff Kerr having sexual intercourse. This videotape was then viewed
by all four, with a total of ten friends, and on three occasions. Given
gender-disparate rules about the inappropriateness of such activity for
women, Kerr was stigmatized as a "porno queen" and asked questions
about her intimate life.
351
KerT's suit alleged a violation of her privacy as well as negligent
infliction of emotional distress, but not intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 52 The jury was asked to consider only the emotional distress
charge, however, and returned findings of liability and substantial damages,
both coippensatory and punitive, against all defendants. Boyle alone
appealed, and the court took the opportunity to overrule its clear and
controlling precedent, which had "create[d] a general duty not to inflict
reasonably foreseeable emotional distress. 353
The Texas Supreme Court, which had already recognized a general
duty not to negligently inflict emotional distress, beat an unabashed retreat
from that position, characterizirfg its seminal decision as "an anomaly," and
reading other cases as consistent with the no-duty rule it was handing
down.3 ' Now the court found its own precedent to be "out of step" with
most other jurisdictions, and held that the right to recover for negligently
inflicted emotional distress would only be honored when the plaintiffcould
establish the breach of some independent duty.355
3 11 Id at 594.
32 There has been much speculation about the decision not to press the inten-
tional infliction case, since the conduct certainly appears to satisfy the "extreme
and outrageous conduct" requirement of that tort. Justice Gonzales may have been
correct in his concurring opinion, attributing that decision to the observation that
insurance was not available for intentional torts. Id at 603-05 (Gonzales, J.,
concurring.) As Justice Doggett pointed out in dissent, however, the status of the
intentional infliction tort was unclear at the time of suit. Id at 605-07 (Doggett, J.,
dissenting). The remarks in the text are directed to the majority's holding: that the
tort of negligently inflicted emotional distress is now abolished in Texas. Id at 594.
Professor Ellen Pryor has written an insightful article on the practice of
underlitigating claims (as by alleging negligence where the conduct was
i.tentional) in order to gain (potential) access to ipsurance that might otherwise be
unavailable. Ellen S. Pryor, The Stories We Tell: Intentional Harm and the Quest
for Insurance Funding, 75 Tax. L. REV. 1721 (1997). She proposes some useful
steps to reduce underlitigating claims. Id at 1750-63. She recognizes, however, that
these steps, even if followed, are unlikely to eliminate the problem, and notes that
"one is hard-pressed to make the argument that underlitigating undermines
corrective justice." Id at 1724.
353 Boyles, 855 S.W.2d at 595.
354 Id at 597.
3 1 Id at 595-96.
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Even if one were to agree that the tort should be reserved for cases in
which an independent duty could be found, there remains the important
matter of whether such a duty might exist in this case. One might therefore
expect careful, thoughtful discussion of the point, since, again, "duties are
not discoverable facts of nature."3' But the court said only: "The law has
heretofore not sought to impose specific legal duties based solely on a
personal relationship, even an intimate one.""35 Should the law recognize
such a duty, though? The court never addresses the reasons for doing so, or
refraining from doing so. Yet it favorably cites cases in which recovery was
granted for the emotional distress caused by mishandling a corpse, by
transmitting untimely or erroneous information that a loved one had died,
and by negligent misrepresentation.35 As Justice Doggett points out in
dissent, the majority disrespects tort principles in dismissing the chief duty
determinant, foreseeability, as having no manageable limits, rather than
taking foreseeability as a point of departure.359 Indeed, the court offers no
analysis or support at all for the no-duty rule it imposes.3"
The court's unwillingness to carefully engage the question of whether
Boyles owed Kerr a duty is not surprising; if it had, it would have been
hard-pressed to resist concluding that the circumstances dictate that such
a duty be recognized. Recovery is permitted in the telegram and corpse
cases precisely because the circumstances make it highly likely that the
plaintiff will suffer serious emotional distress, and to place the proper
incentives on the defendants to act carefully. Is the same not likely here?
Should not one have the right, enforceable in law, to expect that one's most
intimate acts will not be "shared" with others? Why is there not a "specific
duty" to the other person in an intimate relationship? Why is this case,
which involves an intentional misrepresentation through concealment, not
worse than the negligent misrepresentation case in which Texas does
recognize a duty? Why is this not a case of silence in the face of a duty to
disclose (the presence of the camera) or to refrain from the act in ques-
tion?
356 Tarasoffv. Bd. of Regents, 551 P.2d 334,342 (Cal. 1976).
3s7 Boyles, 855 S.W.2d at 600.
Is dI at 597.
39 1d at 605-06 (Doggett, J., dissenting).
36' A similar failure to engage the duty question thoughtfully is evident in a
recent loss of consortium case. Ford Motor Co. v. Miles, 967 S.W.2d 377 (Tex.
1998). There, the court held that neither a sibling nor a stepparent could state a
claim for loss of consortium. The decision was largely based on lack of precedent
from other jurisdictions, and on the fact that the state's wrongful death statute does
not permit recovery to either class of plaintiffs. Id at 382-84.
2000-2001]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
These questions, the court does not trouble itself to even address, and
attempts to assuage its critics by noting that the defendants owed Kerr other
duties based on their intentional misconduct. Even if true,36' the statement
is irrelevant. Under the majority's reasoning, Kerr would have no cause of
action had the videotaping and distribution been negligent rather than
intentional. But, why? Are the corpse, telegram and negligent misrepresen-
tation cases to be overruled? If not, how is this case different? The decision
is so deficient in analysis that one can only speculate. Thus does the court
(willfully) fail to understand tort's foundational duty issues.
The Texas Court's ill-conceived approach in tort cases has also led it
to do away with a bright-line rule that did make sense. In Keetch v. The
Kroger Co.,362 the court staked out bold new ground in finding that, even
when the employee of the defendant had created the unsafe condition that
caused the plaintiff's fall, the employer could not, as a matter of law, be
charged with notice of the defective condition. The court casually
dismissed the uniform law in Texas and throughout the rest of the country
to the contrary-law thatwas extensively cited by Justice Mauzy in dissent.
In citing a host of annotations on the issue, Justice Mauzy pointed out the
conclusion that "[n]o case.., has so much as intimated disagreement with,
or possible qualification of, this principle."3 3 Unlike the majority, which
simply stated the factually true but legally unpersuasive fact that an
employee might create a condition and be unaware of it, Justice Mauzy
explored the policy justifications for imposing liability as a matter of law:
"Unlike a customer, a store owner or occupier has control over the store
and its employees, and is able to adopt policies to protect the public....
[T]he traditional rule encourages the adoption of safeguards to prevent
injury. Conversely,... the majority removes the incentive for store owners
... to take precautions .... "' Given the employees' self-interest, too, one
might expect a de facto policy of"[1]ook the other way."'36 Is there some
countervailing reason of policy or fairness that supports the court's
unprecedented conclusion? Perhaps, but the court offers none, preferring
instead to spend several pages explaining why the unbroken string of cases
to the contrary do not mean what they say.
361 As Justice Doggett points out, one reading the case can be forgiven for
skepticism as to whether the plaintiff actually has another cause of action. Id at
606-07.
362Keetch v. Kroger Co., 845 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. 1992).
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Texas is but one (particularly egregious example) ofjudicial failure to
come to grips with the difficult duty questions that litigants summon courts
to decide2' Until there is a change in membership of hostile courts,
plaintiffs suffering a wrongful loss to their same-sex relationships should
not sue in these states. In deciding whether a state might be receptive to
recognizing relational injuries to same-sex couples, it is wise to look to the
court's recent methodology in torts cases. Does the court engage in
thoughtful consideration of the policies that support, or do not support,
imposition of a duty, or does it prefer the uncritical path of stating
defendant-friendly, bright-line rules that sweep too broadly?
These observations should not be read to suggest that courts can, or
should, allow every claim to proceed. Indeed, the New Jersey Supreme
Court's recent history shows that it is possible to use foreseeability as the
principal determinant of liability while respecting both judicial limitations
and fairness to defendants. In Dunphy v. Gregor,367 the court squarely
confronted the difficulty of a duty analysis: "The imposition of a duty is the
conclusion of a rather complex analysis that considers the relationship of
the parties, the nature of the risk-that is, its foreseeability and sever-
ity-and the impact the imposition of a duty would have on public policy."
The difficulty of the task, however, is no excuse for avoiding it; indeed,
"traditional principles of tort liability can be adapted to address areas in
which recognition of a cause of action and the imposition of a duty of care
are both novel and controversial."36'
In Dunphy, as noted earlier, the court's" 'sedulous application' of the
principles of tort law"369 led it to extend recovery to the surviving female
intimate ofayoung man whose negligently caused death she had witnessed.
The intimacy of the relationship, the court recognized, would make more
likely the kind of serious emotional distress that the tort required. Suc-
cinctly put, "[tihe quality of the relationship creates the severity of the
loss. '37O Further, allowing such recovery would impose no "additional,
"' Contrary to the position taken by Professor Powers, supra note 346, 1 do not
believe that "particularizing" a duty so as to leave injured plaintiffs outside of its
scope properly discharges the court's responsibility in the field of torts. His own
discussion of the cases makes inescapable the conclusion that the court is using a
"no duty" rule in these cases as a subterfuge for removing them from the jury's
consideration, despite his argument to the contrary. Id at 1704-10.
367 Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 376 (N.J. 1994).
1
6 1 Id (emphasis added).
369 Id (quoting People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 495
A.2d 107, 111 (N.J. 1985)).370Id at 377-78.
2000-2001]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
unfair burden... on potential wrongdoers."3 ' The duty (here, to drive
carefully) is not heightened, or changed in any way. Nor is the class of
potential plaintiffs appreciably expanded; rather, the unmarried cohabitant
is "substituted in" for the married partner to whom a duty is already owed.
On the other hand, considerations of fairness and of confining liability to
manageable limits has led the New Jersey Supreme Court, in other
bystander cases, to take seriously the requirement of contemporaneous
observation. Although, in a given circumstance, emotional injury to a third
party might be quite severe even absent observation, the much larger class
of potential plaintiffs might suggest liability to defendants out of proportion
to fault, especially where the injury-causing act was no worse than
negligent." One might disagree with the court's conclusion, on balance,
but the central lesson is that the court does not shrink from the admittedly
arduous task of grappling with tort's intrinsically troublesome cases.
Instead, it welcomes the challenges these cases present, engaging in
thoughtful discussion of the issues and implications of extending duties to
cover novel situations.
A recent example that shows the New Jersey court's willingness to
confront the intractable difficulty of the duty issue in torts isKuzmicz v. Ivy
Hill Park Apartments, Inc.3" There, plaintiff was a tenant of the defen-
dant's who had been seriously injured on a vacant lot between his
apartment complex and a grocery store, from which he had been returning.
The defendant was concededly aware of the danger of such an assault on
the lot. Its administrator had complained to the Newark Board of Education
(also a defendant), which owned the vacant lot, about criminal activity on
the lot and of vandalism to defendant's fence separating its property from
the lot. The plaintiff had followed the tenants' "standard practice" of
walking through a large gap in the fence, thereby shaving an economical six
minutes from the walk time to and from the supermarket.
The issue presented was whether the apartment owner owed tenants a
duty, which could only have been either to keep the fence in good repair,
or to warn the tenants of the danger of criminal activity in the neighboring
lot. Splitting 4-3, the court held that no such duty should be imposed on the
landlord. The majority was careful to affirm its earlier, consistent holdings
371 Id. at 377.
31 See cases discussed in Dunphy, id at 376. The court also cited favorably to
a case from the New Jersey Superior Court in which the plaintiffhad witnessed the
death of a close friend's child. Id (citing Eyrich ex rel. Eyrich v. Dam, 473 A.2d
539 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984)).
373Kuzmicz v. Ivy Hill Park Apts. Inc., 688 A.2d 1018 (N.J. 1997).
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that a landlord did owe tenants a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect
them from injuries by third parties. The duty, however, generally extends
only to the premises, not to activities taking place off-site. The court also
affirmed the exception to that rule for off-premises cases: liability is
appropriate where the defendant realizes an economic benefit from
"activities that directly benefit the landowner."374 In Kuzmicz, despite
plaintiff's inferences to the contrary,7 5 the defendant received no such
benefit.
Thus, recognizing a duty here would have expanded liability to off-
premises cases in which the defendant failed to take some precaution that
might have dissuaded plaintiff from encountering a known danger. Under
the facts of this case, the question was close and difficult. On the one hand,
the principal duty lay with the Board, as lot owner;, the court noted that Ivy
Hill had repeatedly told the Board of its concern about the condition and
danger of the lot, and had even offered to purchase the lot so that Ivy Hill
might take control of the situation. 6 Thus, the fault of the Board, not of
Ivy Hill, seemed primary. Further, extending the duty past the owner of the
premises on which the crime took place creates a risk that should not be
disregarded, particularly in economically troubled areas: "[The] duty
carries costs, which provide a disincentive to own rental property in urban
areas." 3' Finally, if such a duty were recognized here, why not as to other
places to which the tenants might travel?
On the other hand, Ivy Hill was obviously aware of the danger, had in
the past repaired the fence (but had not exercised reasonable care in
maintaining it), and its security staff had informally warned some of the
tenants against taking the shortcut. The court in Ivy Hill could have
established a limited duty to protect tenants against a known danger where
defendant might greatly reduce the danger by taking a precaution (fixing
the fence) within its control.3
3 4 Id at 1022. Examples included cases where a customer was struck by a car
while crossing a road separating defendant's restaurant from its parking lot,
Warrington v. Bird, 499 A.2d 1026 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985), and where
a caterer's invitee was killed while crossing a highway to reach a parking lot that
the defendant knew the plaintiff would be likely to use. Mulraney v. Auletto's
Catering, 680 A.2d 793 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
171 The contention was that, since the apartment and the shopping centerhad the
same manager, it was in their mutual economic interest to facilitate movement
between these two locations.
376 Kuzmicz, 688 A.2d at 1018-19.
377 Id at 1023.
371 This argument works only as to a possible duty to fix the fence. If it were
used to impose a duty to warn, it is very difficult to see why such a duty would then
not be imposed to warn of any number of dangers that a tenant in a high-crime area,
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The court's decision not to extend the duty to such a case is at least
defensible. If the question is who can best take the precautions that might
have averted the injury in this case, it is reasonable to answer that the
property owner is in that position. Here, had the Board of Education cleared
out the debris and posted security in the area, the incident might have been
avoided even if the shortcut had been used. Alternatively, the security force
might have (justifiably) prevented the tenants from using the shortcut.
When a court has carefully considered the cost of imposing anew duty, and
decided on balance that it should not do so, tort's imperatives have been
respected. Those representing parties injured in relation to their same-sex
partners should ask: Does this jurisdiction respect the mission of tort law,
or does it not?
B. The Practical Side of Litigation: Questions and Answers
Even where courts may seem willing to take same-sex plaintiffs'
ground-breaking relational injury claims seriously, one might ask what
reasonably should be done. First, this Article is intended as an invitation for
advocacy groups to become alerted to the possibility of bringing such cases,
either on their own or in cooperation with personal injury attorneys.
Organizations with large numbers of lawyers as members or contributors,
such as the Human Right Campaign and Lambda Legal Defense and
Education Fund could consider possible advantages to bringing suit.379
Attorneys working for, or supporting, such organizations will naturally be
less likely to be dismissive of the intimate lives of the couples before them
than would ordinarily be the case. Once a few promising cases (again, in
the states that take tort principles seriously) have been brought, momentum
might develop: organizations could share information, and victories in one
case could engender further successes. Vermont would obviously be a good
place to start, but the presence of a marriage-like relationship there, in
addition to a specific statute, might make translating success to other
jurisdictions elusive. As this Article's discussions ofNew Jersey cases and
methodology have made clear, thatjurisdiction would also be a good choice
for advocates. In general, one might hope that courts with sympathy to
injured torts plaintiffs in other contexts will be able to overcome the more
or perhaps any tenant at all, might face.
"' Such advocacy has already begun. Sharon Smith's claim is being pursued by
the National Center for Lesbian Rights, and by the Center's Executive Director,
Kate Kendall. See http://www.nclrights.org/cases/html (last visited May 30,2001).
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general judicial aversion to confronting the intimate lives of same-sex
couples discussed earlier in this Article.
How, though, might attorneys avoid the real problem that an unsympa-
thetic jury might end up torpedoing the primary, personal injury claim
because of the revelation concerning sexual orientation that a loss of
consortium claim requires? One solution is to request that the court split off
the loss of consortium claim, trying it separately. Judges of course have
authority to do so,38 and might be persuaded of the desirability of such
bifurcation, provided, first, that they are sympathetic to the claim; and
second, that the advocate can demonstrate (as through the polling data
referenced earlier)3 ' that the possibility of jury prejudice is sufficiently
great that the sacrifice of judicial economy is worth the gain in justice.
Cases involving relational losses to same-sex couples might be ideal
candidates for separate trials of those claims. As the court stated in
Monaghan v. SZS 33 Assocs.3 2: "A district court may order separate trials
to prevent the factfinder from being exposed to evidence admitted for the
purpose of addressing one claim that would contaminate his mind regarding
a different claim."
As for wrongful death claims outside of Vermont and Hawaii, the lack
of likelihood of success may mean that a personal injury lawyer is less
likely to take the case. Advocacy groups might consider financing such
cases, but only in jurisdictions where the language of the statute is
sufficiently ambiguous that some prospect of success can be imagined.
Otherwise, the better strategy here would be to pursue legislative reform.
Hawaii's recent innovations in this area, and Vermont's emerging "civil
union" status, have been discussed earlier.3" Changes in wrongful death
statutes might also precipitatejudicial recognition of loss of consortium and
negligent infliction of emotional distress cases brought by same-sex
couples.
CONCLUSION
Through a paradoxical effort of willful denial, courts have shown
remarkable consistency in granting only those rights to same-sex couples
that do not require focusing on the sexual intimacy of such couples. Where,
38 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, by way of influential example,
Rule 42(b) states that a court, "in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice
... may order a separate trial of any claim."
381 See supra note 305 and accompanying text.
382Monaghan v. SZS 33 Assocs., 827 F. Supp. 233,244 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
383See supra notes 281-86 (Hawaii) and 114-17 (Vermont).
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as in the case of same-sex marriage, such avoidance is impossible, the
couples have been spectacularly unsuccessful.
Tortious injuries to relations are, to a greater or lesser extent, about
intimacy, and we should therefore not be surprised that same-sex couples
have been unsuccessful in this arena, too. The lack of success, however,
cannot be satisfactorily explained by judicial disapproval: there are simply
very few decided cases. This Article has explored several sources of this
"clanging silence," and, through consideration of judicial fidelity to the
basic tenets of tort, suggests some strategies for breaking through the
barriers that have, by and large, kept these cases out of court.
It might be argued that there are scores of issues of importance to gay
and lesbian people, and that these tort claims should not engage the limited
energy ofadvocacy. As Sharon Smith'stragic case illustrates, however, this
response underestimates the transformative power of the tort law, which is
a powerful instrument for recognition of duties and vindication of rights of
all citizens. Because these rights and duties are created under the broad
sweep of liability for foreseeable risk, their impact is felt more broadly than
that of laws designed to address more specific issues. Judicial recognition
that the duty to avoid interfering with relations extends to gay people both
creates a specific right and announces a general principle: Same-sex
couples enjoy healthy lives of committed intimacy.
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